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Abstract 
 
Can the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), as the dedicated and fielded UN intelligence 
capability, mitigate challenges in providing the United Nations (UN) Mission Leadership 
Team (MLT) intelligence that ultimately will improve the decision making process and 
enhance the ability of the UN to fulfill the will of the international community?  
 
Throughout this paper, this is the driving question. To address the question, the paper 
explores the JMAC concept as described in UN policy and guidelines as well as experiences 
of UN peace operations
1
 in the 21
st
 century and particularly the ongoing operations in Mali 
and South Sudan. The paper will identify challenges that UN peace operations in general, and 
Mali and South Sudan specifically, have experienced. If the JMAC proves capable of 
mitigating these challenges properly, the JMAC concept can succeed. 
 
UN peace operations have experienced a transitional development from peacekeeping 
operations under chapter VI of the UN Charter towards more peace enforcement and 
protection of civilians in line with chapter VII. Both operations require analyzed information
2
 
and information sharing at various levels, with various means, different actors, mandates and 
perceptions. There is extensive literature elaborating on Intelligence and the UN. Recently, 
the UN has produced Guidelines and Policy describing the role of intelligence and the JMAC, 
which, in combination with document studies and interviews, will serve as a theoretical basis 
for this paper. There have, furthermore, been several studies of JMACs in UN peace operation 
missions identifying numerous challenges.  This study, however, might enhance our 
understanding of Intelligence in UN peace operations and to what extent the JMAC, using the 
Intelligence Cycle as a framework, is able to address intelligence challenges in the UN. 
Throughout the paper, and the discussion, the challenges are elaborated and discussed as to 
whether they pose limitations or possibilities for the JMAC to succeed in UN peace 
operations. 
 
The findings from the research indicates that, though the  JMAC concept has vastly enhanced 
UN capabilities in peace operations, there are some grave challenges that cannot be addressed 
                                                 
1
 The term «peace operations” will be elaborate in more detail in chapter 1.3 and 3. 
2
 Processed and analysed information is generally referred to as Intelligence within the Military. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
IV 
by the JMAC alone. Intelligence in the UN is contested with a lack of coherent terminology 
complicating the understanding and discussion. Furthermore, intelligence in the UN and all 
the steps in the Intelligence Cycle, can be more effectively addressed if there is a responsible 
and accountable strategic entity that ensures information sharing at all levels from the field to 
New York. The paper concludes that the JMAC cannot mitigate key UN Intelligence 
challenges, realize its potential and succeed without an overarching intelligence body. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Theme and actuality 
The United Nations (UN) was established on 24 October 1945 in the aftermath of two world 
wars and was dedicated, in the enduring words of the UN Charter, to saving “succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.” (United Nations, 2017a, p. Preamble) 
Initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict, UN Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO) have increasingly been used in intra-state conflicts and civil wars, which 
are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and 
fluctuating lines of command (United Nations, 2003, p. 1). Peacekeeping operations have 
traditionally been considered as instrumental in consolidating confidence among conflicting 
parties and monitoring the effective respect of the ceasefire by those who signed it (DPKO & 
DFS, 2014, p. 1). One of the key principles of PKO has traditionally been to ensure the 
consent of the parties. As the nature of UN peace operations have been changing in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, some claim that consent as principle is being challenged.  
Historically Peacekeepers are primarily associated with light armament solely for the purpose 
of self-defense in case they were attacked. These missions were authorized under Chapter VI 
of the United Nations Charter. A growing number of United Nations peace operations have 
become multi-dimensional in nature, composed of a range of components, including 
“military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, 
reconstruction, public information and gender” (United Nations, 2003, p. Foreword).  
From the 1990s to the early 2000 UN peace operations have been deployed in countries where 
consent was limited and security therefore a critical issue. The word peacekeeping did not 
reflect reality as the UN increasingly got involved in operations where there was no peace to 
keep. Traditional peacekeeping operations were repeatedly confronted with major human 
rights violations without having the means to stop them. Thus, a new generation of 
operations, the so-called “robust” peacekeeping operations were launched (DPKO & DFS, 
2014, p. 1). In these types of operations, the military component was authorized to use force, 
not only in self-defense, but also when necessary to achieve the mission’s mandate.  
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UN Security Council resolutions in the first decade of the 21st Century introduced UN peace 
operations to less permissive environments sometimes with extremist groups and non-state 
actors operating asymmetrically with extremist ideologies or without clear political agendas  
(DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). The Council authorized missions to “use all necessary means” to 
carry out its mandate, and sometimes, a regional organization or a coalition of willing 
member states were authorized to execute the UN mandate. Mandates and missions crossing 
the Peacekeeping Rubicon of Consent were increasingly authorized with a Chapter VII 
Mandate or under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). Following this 
evolution, United Nations peace operations developed in complexity and are now generally 
launched as multi-dimensional operations involving highly specialized civilian, military and 
police personnel serving with various capabilities.  
The threat imposed to both peacekeepers and local populations in some of today’s 
peacekeeping missions marks a fundamental shift from the past, and may at times require 
careful interpretation of the traditional core principles of peacekeeping; consent of the parties, 
impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate 
(DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). Despite these challenges, the United Nations has preserved its’ 
position as an unique global forum for peace and security in the sense that it brings together 
the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Secretariat, Troop and Police 
Contributors, and regional organizations as relevant, and the Host Governments (DPKO & 
DFS, 2014, p. 2). A combined and united effort to maintain international peace and security 
under the mandate of the Security Council can be the result.  
However, fearing the loss of sovereignty, UN member states have historically been hesitant to 
provide the UN with an intelligence-collection mandate. The increased size, length and 
complexity of peace operations, compounded by severe security threats to UN personnel, 
have convinced nations about the need for a stronger UN intelligence capability, especially in 
the field (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 2). In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations (HIPPO) clearly stated the need for timely, high quality and actionable 
information as central to effective performance. The Panel reiterated many of the findings and 
recommendations highlighted in the Brahimi report
3
 15 years earlier. Missions, they stated, 
                                                 
3
 In 1999 Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to assess the 
shortcomings of the existing peace operations system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for 
change. The result is known as the “Brahimi Report” after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel.  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
10 
“suffer from reporting overload and yet the sum of that reporting often fails to yield the 
necessary information and analysis”. The Panel advocated that the United Nations Secretariat 
“must overhaul the functioning of information and analysis structures and systems within 
missions to deliver significantly streamlined reporting, more effective information 
management and significantly enhanced analytical capacities” (High-Level Independent Panel 
on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 58). The Panel, furthermore, underlined the need for 
information management at the strategic level, being the Secretariat.  
The Panel further called on all Member States, including Host Governments, to share any 
information that may relate to the security of United Nations personnel (High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 50). The recommendations from the Panel 
touched upon many important aspects that are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s September 2015 report on “The future of United Nations 
peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations” addresses the need to improve UN intelligence capabilities:  
An effective system for the acquisition, analysis and operationalization of information 
for peace operations in complex environments is lacking. I have tasked the Secretariat 
with developing parameters for an information and intelligence framework that can 
support field missions in operating effectively and safely. ....... The increasing use of 
armoured vehicles and technology, improved communications, information gathering 
and analysis, training and quality medical care, as well as guard units, are some of 
the most effective ways to keep our personnel safe, and I will continue to pursue 
advances across all of those fronts. (UN Secretary General, 2015a, p. 20). 
In parallel with the HIPPO report, there were several ongoing activities to frame Intelligence 
in the UN. The JMAC Policy and Guidelines documents were both published in 2015. The 
UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy was published in May of 2017. Thus, this paper will 
provide a timely contribution to the general debate about the JMAC concept, UN Intelligence 
in general, as well as the development of an UN Intelligence policy. 
 
The JMAC was introduced as a concept by MajGen Patrick Cammaert, military advisor to the 
Secretary General in 2003 (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017). Recognizing the changing nature of UN 
operations and sparked by the 2003 attack at the UN SRSG in Iraq in 2003, a firm 
understanding about the need for intelligence gradually developed, if for no other reason than 
to protect UN personnel. Intelligence suddenly became an important focal point of the UN in 
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order to enhance their peace operations capability. Since 2003 the JMAC has, when it has 
been established, been subject to different mandates, organization, staffing and focus. 
Nonetheless, the JMAC has been identified as the focal point for UN Intelligence in peace 
operations and with 14 years of experience - is it up for the task?   
 
1.2 Statement of Problem and Research Questions 
The overall problem throughout the paper is; Can the Joint Mission Analysis Center succeed 
in mitigating key challenges to Intelligence in UN peace operations? 
 
In order to operationalize the problem, two supporting research questions have been 
developed. Each question consists of two parts that will be discussed in the same context; 
1A What are the key challenges of UN Intelligence? 
1B  What are the impact of UN Intelligence key challenges? 
 
2A How can these challenges be mitigated? 
2B Is the JMAC capable of mitigating the key challenges? 
 
1.3 Key terms 
Throughout the short history of the Joint Mission Analysis Centers, it has experienced 
different set-ups and configurations. Besides experiences coming from the JMACs in Mali 
and South Sudan, the paper will use the generic description of JMAC as presented in the UN 
official documents. The JMAC concept will be presented in more detail in chapter 3.  
Intelligence has many associations and definitions. In chapter 3.2, the term Intelligence will 
be explained in the context of UN peace operations.  
The main challenge following the problem, and the basis for being able to present a 
conclusion, is how to measure success.  Operationalizing the term succeed will enable a 
conclusion and furthermore define the method that will be used in this paper which will be 
elaborated in more detail in chapter 2.1. 
The term UN peace operation requires some clarification. In most documents, especially of 
older origin, the terms peacekeeping operations covers all UN missions. As UN missions 
evolved, the terms robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement were increasingly used. More 
recently, the terms multi-dimensional or stabilization operations are used. The terms are used 
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inconsistently throughout UN official documents, which will be elaborated in more detail in 
chapter 3.1. Throughout the rest of this paper, the term peace operation is used consistently
4
. 
The term peace operation is understood as “an overarching umbrella” for all UN peace 
operation activities ranging from Special Political to peace enforcement missions. 
 
 
2 Research design 
2.1 Demarcations, Framework and Method 
 
The main focus of this paper is UN peace operations in the 21
st
 century. As there are several 
analysis and evaluation reports from the JMACs from 2003 until present day, there was no 
need to conduct a quantitative analysis of the JMAC concept to acquire a good understanding 
of the challenges. Furthermore, realizing the structural and operational differences between all 
current JMACs, it would be extremely challenging and time consuming to analyze or conduct 
field research to acquire new and up-to-date knowledge of JMAC practices. To restrain the 
scope of the paper and literature as well as providing a focused approach, two UN missions 
were identified as especially relevant to investigate in more detail – Mali and South Sudan. 
Both missions are currently operational, they are both in Africa, their mandates are similar; 
chapter VII peace enforcement operation, and both are multi-dimensional. 
 
A limited knowledge of UN peace operations and the organization at the start facilitated an 
open-mindedness, both concerning literature and any possible conclusions to the findings. 
Lack of prejudices has been liberating in terms of analysis, enabling what Jacobsen refers to 
as a critical distance and analytical objectivity (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 38), though challenging in 
term of understanding UN peace operations and ensuring the consistency required in a master 
thesis.  
 
As there are many actors involved in UN peace operations, each provide a different 
perspective that can be explored. Choice of perspective will limit literature, findings as well 
as the conclusion. The perspective in the paper has mainly been colored by international 
politics academics, military officers and UN documents and less by the Humanitarian, 
                                                 
4
 Except for quotations and when peacekeeping is referred to as defined in UN Capstone doctrine of 2008. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
13 
Civilian and Police components
5
. The majority of literature has been provided by European 
and North American countries and literature posing important limitations. The references used 
are interesting and challenging considering the fact that the majority of UN peace operations 
take place in Africa and the main troop contributing nations are from Asia and Africa. This 
may have left out important aspects. But, as the JMAC is multi-dimensional in nature, it has 
been important to include more than just the military aspects and challenges in the paper. 
 
Though UN peace operations in South Sudan and Mali are referred to extensively, the paper 
has a generic approach to UN, Intelligence and JMAC. It is important to be aware that some 
JMACs have different challenges than those included in this paper, and that challenges in one 
mission can be non-existent in another. The generic nature of the challenges, as will be 
discussed in chapter 4, therefore makes the findings relevant for future UN peace operations 
and missions as well as UN policy documents.  
 
 
While secret information collection certainly may constitute part of an intelligence 
organization’s function, intelligence may also refer to the analytical process and the products 
generated thereby. The intelligence analytical process – often referred to as the Intelligence 
Cycle – will constitute the framework6 to investigate if the JMAC can mitigate UN 
intelligence challenges. Even though some question the relevance of the Intelligence Cycle, 
no one has come up with good alternative concepts that has earned the right to replace it. The 
Intelligence Cycle is used both by NATO and Norwegian Intelligence communities. There is, 
however, some small discrepancies between the NATO and UN Peacekeeping Intelligence 
Cycle
7
. Throughout this paper, the UN model will be used to frame the discussion. UN 
Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy contains five elements; Direction/Tasking, Acquisition, 
Collation/Evaluation, Analysis and Dissemination as presented in figure 1. (United Nations 
DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 5). In chapter 5, the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle
8
 will frame 
the discussion about UN Intelligence challenges in peace operation. 
 
                                                 
5
 Literature from humanitarian entities involving Intelligence is naturally limited. 
6
 A framework portrays relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or activity 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Architecture_(military) 
7
 NATO has four steps – Direction, Collection, Analysis and Dissemination whereas UN has five steps.  
8
 The Intelligence Cycle will not be elaborated in detail as it serves a structural, not a theoretical purpose in the 
paper. 
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Figure 1: UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle 
 
Decisions in the Security Council and available intelligence capabilities found the basis for 
Tasking and Direction. Tasking and Direction, step one in the Intelligence Cycle,  refer to the 
process of identifying questions that need to be answered, specifying outstanding Information 
or Intelligence Requirements (IRs) in relation to those questions, and seeking this information 
through a variety of means. Tasking involves prioritization of scarce intelligence assets to 
answer the IRs.  
 
Acquisition
9
 refers to the process of obtaining data and information to serve as the basis for 
analysis. Acquisition can be done openly or with covert sensors. Effective acquisition requires 
direction and planning to ensure resources is used most effectively meet the IRs
10
.  
 
Data acquired by missions shall be recorded and stored in a manner that permits convenient 
comparison, evaluation, assessment, retrieval, analysis and reporting. Examination and 
Collation furthermore require that participating mission entities make use of standardized 
tools for the collation of data, including common databases, taxonomies and planned indexing 
and menus.  
                                                 
9
 NATO uses the term Collection. 
10
 This includes tasking assets within their capabilities and according to IRs, ensuring intelligence is reported in a 
timely manner and putting in place mechanisms to ensure corroboration and/or verification of information and 
data. 
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Analysis refers to the methodical breaking down of information into its component parts, to 
find interrelationships, and application of reasoning to determine the meaning of the parts and 
the whole.  
 
Dissemination is the process of conveying intelligence to mission decision-makers and other 
relevant mission personnel. Peacekeeping intelligence products developed as part of the 
peacekeeping intelligence cycle may be disseminated directly by individual participating 
mission entities to their respective managers or jointly through the mission intelligence 
coordination structure.  
 
Realizing that choosing a method is “a pragmatic choice to best define the research design 
best suited to address the specific problem” (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 41), the research questions 
(chapter 1.2) largely defined the structure of the paper and framed the discussion in chapter 4 
and 5. The identification and impact of key UN Intelligence challenges in chapter 4, found the 
basis for the analysis as to whether the JMAC can mitigate these challenges. Some challenges 
might have strategic ramifications, but are still relevant to explore, as the JMAC is currently 
the focal point of UN intelligence
11
. Conclusions for each identified challenge will be 
developed using a taxonomy that is an adaptation and combination of standard risk 
management and intelligence report validation formats. There are no quantitative estimates 
available enabling a statistical analysis of JMAC success. As each JMAC is organized 
differently and each mission is unique. The taxonomy in table 1 and 2 will be used to classify 
the challenges and mitigation based upon literature and interview findings. 
 
The impact rating in table 1 indicates the effect a challenge will have - high or medium
12
 - on 
UN and JMAC ability to comply with UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy.  
   
        
                                                 
11
 Major Carsten Hagen confirmed in a meeting on 10 November that UNOCC believe that the JMAC has 
mandates that  influence and support both the operational and strategic level 
12
 As only key challenges will be addressed, no challenges with a low impact will be presented in chapter 4. 
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Table 1: Impact Legend 
                              
Probability rating in table 2 refers to the likelihood that the JMAC is capable to address and 
mitigate the challenge successfully. Probability is labelled as highly likely, likely or not 
likely. 
 
 
Table 2: Probability Legend 
 
 
Findings in literature, combined with interviews and the analysis in chapters 4 and 5, found 
the basis for a qualitative rating of UN Intelligence challenges and possible JMAC mitigation. 
The conclusions following the analysis and rating will represent either limitations or 
possibilities. Limitations and possibilities categorization is based upon the nature of the 
challenge and probability that the JMAC is capable of addressing the challenge. Limitations 
will suggest that the JMAC will not succeed, whereas possibilities can represent a chance for 
success if exploited correctly. The combination of the severity of the challenge and the 
probability for JMAC mitigation will be the indicators that will enable to answer the overall 
problem – Can the JMAC succeed?  
 
Each key challenge will be associated with one step
13
 in the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence 
Cycle to better structure the analysis. As visualized in figure 2 below, the research question 
analysis (middle circle) – key challenges and their impact followed by JMAC capability to 
mitigate – is structured by the Intelligence Cycle steps (outer circle). Combined they found 
                                                 
13
 One challenge might be associated to several challenges, e.g. classification. The most relevant step will be 
used to better structure the analysis. 
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the overall structure and methodology for the paper. The analysis of key challenges will 
enable the paper to conclude whether the JMAC can succeed. If key challenges represents 
possibilities, it would be likely that the JMAC can succeed (inner circle) in mitigating UN 
intelligence challenges. Unresolved challenges will be limitations and remain key challenges. 
 
 
Figure 2: Operationalizing key challenges and JMAC success 
2.2 Literature Review and Interviews 
Experiences from post-Cold War UN peace operations, followed by several high profiled UN 
reports in the last 17 years, as well as development of new UN concepts and publications, 
have raised the attention of Intelligence and UN amongst academics and scientists in the 21
st
 
century. Walter Dorn
14
 has been a significant advocate for technological improvements and 
enhanced intelligence collection capabilities in modern UN peace operations.  
 
In the last 2 years, several reports have provided important knowledge to the field of UN and 
Intelligence. The reports are especially relevant, as they have been developed by scientists and 
                                                 
14
 Walter Dorn is Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and 
the Canadian Forces College (CFC). Among other things, he specializes in peace operations and the United 
Nations. He also served as a consultant with the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including on 
the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping. 
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academics with either an extensive intelligence background or knowledge of the UN in 
combination with field investigations of intelligence architecture in current UN peace 
operations. The All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) experiment in Mali
15
, with 
reports from Nordli & Lindboe and Rietjens & Waard, has provided important perspectives. 
As have the more generic approaches relating to information sharing, JMAC and situational 
awareness by Abilova & Novosseloff, Theunens and Willmot. The latter reports describe 
challenges regarding UN and Intelligence and Willmot goes far in recommending a strategic 
intelligence capability. Theunens provides some interesting perspectives in regards to 
terminology, suggesting that the UN should replace Intelligence with Understanding. Willmot 
advocates an improved UN situational awareness, and by comparing the UN with national 
systems, offers recommendations for the establishment of a UN situational awareness system. All 
the academic reports referred to in this paper are secondary sources. 
 
Some of the reports referred to above define intelligence, some even use the Intelligence 
Cycle, but neither explore in a systematic manner whether the JMAC concept is able to 
address UN key intelligence challenges. The key challenges in this paper equals the indicators 
used to discuss if the JMAC concept can succeed. Combined with a comprehensive approach 
to UN peace operation terminology is where the paper stands out and contributes to the 
discussion about UN and Intelligence.  
 
The primary sources mainly derive from official UN reports, documents and policies. The 
2015 JMAC Policy and Guidelines
16
 are both key to understanding the JMAC concept. The 
2017 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) release of UN Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Policy is important in trying to understand UN and Intelligence and is elaborated 
in more detail in chapter 3.2. The 2015 HIPPO report has provided important contributions to 
the understanding of key characteristics of contemporary UN peace operations and problems. 
All literature referred to above has provided a solid base line for understanding the 
complexity of not just Intelligence, but - even more challenging - the dynamics of United 
Nations in peace operations. 
 
                                                 
15
 The ASIFU was an ISR unit with troops mainly coming from the Netherlands and Sweden. 
16
 The JMAC Guidelines will most probably be replaced by A JMAC Field Handbook is currently drafted by 
UNOCC. 
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The qualitative approach with relevant reports, books and articles is supported by a variety of 
semi-structural interviews with representatives from academia, military, police, humanitarian 
entities and UN (see annex C). The interviews, lasting between 1 and 2 hours, have been 
exploratory, aiming to elaborate on perspectives within each profession based upon the 
research questions. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, but interviews with Police 
and UNMISS were done using e-mail and Facetime. The interviews are referred to as semi-
structural as no recording or pre-defined questionnaire was developed. Jacobsen refers to this 
approach as exploratory as the starting point for the interview, challenges and mitigation, 
should be open to all possibilities and aspects (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 64).  
The research questions served as a starting point for the discussion. Limitations in time as 
well as a numerous different perspectives of each individual in many ways supplemented the 
information and my understanding deriving from literature. Within each field of expertise, 
they were able to broaden the understanding and explain the characteristics and challenges of 
each entity involved in UN peace operations. As these individuals present their own opinions, 
based upon their experience and perspective, I have been careful not to put too much weight 
on their contribution, but treat it as, what it is; the opinion of a very experienced professional 
within the “universe” of UN and Intelligence.   
The interviews proved particularly interesting and relevant in combination with authors that 
had provided academic contributions being referenced in the paper
17
. The interviews served 
several purposes – firstly, it enabled more detailed elaborations regarding concerns and 
formulations in their academic work, secondly, they provided relevant background 
information, vastly enhancing the understanding of the topic, and finally, they were able to 
increase the confidence that references and focus of the paper were coherent and consistent. 
 
Thus, according to Jacobsen, combining several ways of collecting data reinforces the 
qualitative investigations – more methods, perspectives and details about the same 
phenomenon increase the validity and enhance the level of precision of the research 
(Jacobsen, 2015, p. 173).  
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2.3 Outline 
The paper is organized in three main chapters. Chapter 3 presents the background needed to 
understand UN peace operations and Intelligence in the follow-on discussion in chapters 4 
and 5.  
 
Chapter 3 is descriptive and consists of four parts and introduces UN peace operations, UN 
Peacekeeping Intelligence, key actors in relation to the UN and Intelligence and the JMAC 
concept.  
Part 1 provides a basic understanding of UN peace operation terminology and the evolution of 
UN peace operations in relation to mandate and characteristics of contemporary UN peace 
operations. An initial discussion and clarification on the term UN peace operation enables a 
more precise discussion in the following chapters. 
Part 2 explores Intelligence in UN peace operations. First, Intelligence in UN post- Cold War 
peace operations is elaborated as these events are crucial to understand UN and Intelligence 
today. Second, UN and Intelligence, as presented in UN DPKO policy – UN Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Policy – will be briefly presented in order to understand how DPKO relates to 
Intelligence. Finally, part 2 will present different layers and types of intelligence. 
Part 3 presents a brief overview of the key UN organization involved multi-dimensional peace 
operations organization and external actors involved at the strategic and operational level, 
which are equally important to be able to explore UN peace operation intelligence challenges. 
Part 4 briefly presents the focal point of the paper – the JMAC concept - as outlined in UN 
documents. 
 
Chapter 4 will discuss and distil the challenges and impacts of Intelligence in the UN. The 
chapter consists of two parts. Chapter 4 will explore 21
st
 century UN peace operations to 
investigate what are the current challenges for UN intelligence in peace operations. This will 
be analyzed by looking at two ongoing operations – UNMISS in South Sudan and 
MINUSMA in Mali. Following chapter 4, a comprehensive understanding of key intelligence 
challenges and their impact on UN peace operations has been established. 
 
Chapter 5 will analyze and discuss the challenges identified in chapter 4 to explore to what 
extent they represent limitations or possibilities for successful JMAC contributions to UN 
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peace operations. The discussion will be aligned with the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence 
Cycle - Tasking/Direction, Acquisition, Collation and Examination, Analysis and 
Dissemination. The analysis will investigate how, and the probability that, the JMAC can 
mitigate these challenges. The analysis and the findings will be summarized in a table in 
chapter 5.7, which will form the synthesis of the paper. 
 
The conclusion will, following the chapter 5 discussion as to whether the key challenges 
represents limitations or possibilities, predict if the JMAC can succeed.  
 
 
3 UN Peace Operations  
3.1 An introduction to UN Peace Operations 
UN Peace Operations – bridging the terms 
Throughout UN documents, there is a confusing mixture of terms in which old terms are used 
to try to explain modern phenomenon.  Traditionally, UN involvement in international peace 
and security activities has used the term peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has become 
the term symbolizing what UN peace operations was all about and aligned with the key 
principle of the UN developed by Dag Hammarskjold; consent. Consent normally 
materialized in a peace agreement - founding the basis for a peace to keep. However, 
throughout UN history, the consent of the warring factions have been a subject of constant 
change, forcing UN forces to balance other key principles, impartiality and use of force 
except in self-defence, on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The United Nations has developed a wide range of terms and instruments to ensure 
international peace ranging from Special Political Missions, observer missions, preventive 
actions, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, disarmament, economic sanctions and 
peace enforcement in UN peace operations. UN Secretary General's An Agenda for Peace in 
1992 identified four major steps in international conflict management as undertaken by the 
UN (Macdonald, 1997, p. 5): 
 Prevention, including Preventive Deployment 
 Peacemaking 
 Peacekeeping 
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 Peacebuilding. 
These four steps combined with the term peace enforcement founded the basis in the DPKO 
Capstone doctrine of 2008, which is still referred to on the official UN web pages in relation 
to UN Peacekeeping Operations. Prevention “involves the application of structural or 
diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating 
into violent conflict”. Peacemaking “includes measures to address minor conflicts in progress 
and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement”. 
Peace enforcement involves “a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force 
where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace or act of 
aggression”. Peacekeeping is “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, 
where fighting has been halted”. Peacebuilding involves “a range of measures targeted to 
reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all 
levels for conflict management” (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2008, p. 18).  
 
Figure 3: Variety and relationship of UN Peace Operations (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 2) 
 
However, the boundaries between each step have become increasingly blurred. UN official 
Nadia Assouli
18
 confirmed that figure 3 does not reflect how terms are used or how conflicts 
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 Interview on 13 November 2017 (see annex B) 
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are perceived in the UN today. Peacekeeping does not restrict itself to an after ceasefire 
activity and the term, as it is being used, has merged with peace enforcement. According to 
Hough, peace-enforcement is “the creation of peace through the military support of one side 
of a conflict in order to force a victory or a stalemate that makes it rational for the opposing 
side to cease fighting militarily and to begin negotiating diplomatically” (Hough, 2007, p. 14). 
Successful peace-enforcement creates the conditions for peacekeeping. Following the logic of 
Hough, there seems to be a lack of an overarching term to capture the many aspects in UN 
missions.   
To blur the understanding even more, following the Balkan operation in the 1990`s, the term 
robust peacekeeping was introduced. Robust peacekeeping, also referred to as chapter 6 ½  
operations, is defined as “the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the 
Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict” 
(Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 4). The distinction between peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping 
“is thus not about how much force is being used, but rather about the context within which 
force is being used” (Coning, Detzel, & Hojem, 2008, p. 4). According to Findlay there has 
been a confusion of peacekeeping and peace-enforcing mandates, referred to as robust 
peacekeeping, which seems to have “directly contributed to widespread confusion on the 
interpretation of the rules of engagement among troop-contributing countries and 
consequently contributed to the abject failure of the mission” (Findlay, 2002, p. 303). 
 
The Capstone doctrine, in line with the 2003 United Nations Handbook on Multi-dimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, expands on the Peacekeeping term by introducing the term multi-
dimensional peacekeeping which is “also referred to as peace operations” (United Nations, 
2003, p. 1). There seems to be no sound explanation to this lineation of the two expressions as 
multi-dimensional usually is referring to the complexity of the UN operations and that 
different entities – both UN related, international and national - are involved addressing both 
humanitarian, economic, military, state and social concerns in the conflict. As there is no UN 
standard for terms and definitions, new terms introduced by academics, UN officials and 
mission components confuse the debate about UN peace operation and intelligence.  
 
In 2015 the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was given the task “to 
ascertain their relevance and effectiveness for today and tomorrow’s world” (High-Level 
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Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. iii). The name of the Panel indicates a clear 
shift in the understanding of UN involvement, from peacekeeping to peace operations, which 
is the term used consistently throughout the 111 pages document
19
. In the reply from the UN 
SG this consistency is no longer present. The UN can gain by defining and being consistent to 
the terms in use as it facilitates a common understanding and perception. Following the 
consistency of the HIPPO report, peacekeeping operations should be one separate activity 
under UN peace operations. To better understand the nature of UN peace operations 
terminology
20
, figure 4 forms the basis for the paper; 
 
Figure 4: The nature of UN Peace Operations 
 
In figure 4, UN Peace Operations consists of Special Political, Peace Keeping, Robust 
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement missions. The indicators defining the mission is (1) 
level of consent, (2) means being used, (3) level of violence from the parties and the UN, (4) 
the use of force and (5) level of UN impartiality. 
                                                 
19
 Currently there is an ongoing process of re-organizing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The 
proposal is to rename the organization to Department of Peace Operations and to include DPA and DPKO united 
under one Under Secretary General. The term will be more capable to embrace the full nature of modern UN 
peace and security activities.  
20
 UN has an online database with definition, called UNTERM Portal. There is however, no relevant definition 
on the term Peace Operation. 
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Such an understanding might facilitate the discussion and understanding of 21
st
 century UN 
peace operations and clarify the role of Intelligence in preventive and Special Political 
Missions
21
 as well as peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions if 
these terms still prove useful to understand modern UN peace operations. The current UN 
Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy addresses only Peacekeeping. As figure 4 shows; 
Peacekeeping is one of several possible UN involvements, and the indicators pose very 
different challenges to the UN and Intelligence following the specificities of each conflict. 
UN Intelligence requirements must furthermore be defined prior, during and after a conflict, 
which are non-existent in UN current documents.  
The term UN Peace Operations is used consistently throughout the paper to include all 
varieties of UN security and peace activities including Peacekeeping Operations. 
 
Evolution of key characteristics of contemporary UN Peace Operations 
 
The past twenty years have seen an exponential growth of UN peace operations in terms of 
breadth of mandate, scale and duration of operations. Where peace operators in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s were deployed primarily to monitor ceasefires
22
, they are now deployed to 
investigate human rights violations, provide electoral support, manage combatant 
disarmament and reintegration programs, as well as supporting combat operations. This surge 
has required a five-fold rise in the UN peace operations budget over the past ten years
23
. 
However, while the overall capacity of the UN DPKO to plan and implement peace 
operations has grown in line with its increased human and financial resources, “UN capacity 
remains weak in the critical area of strategic information assessments, commonly known as 
intelligence” (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 2). 
 
Though not a recent phenomenon, developed countries regularly lean towards focusing 
resources and efforts on selected regional or bilateral arrangements and organizations. Hence, 
                                                 
21
 Preventive and Special political missions are, according to Nadia Assouli, restricted to DPA activities and are 
accordingly not included in the current DPKO produced UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy. 
22
 Traditional UN peacekeeping as we know it 
23
 From US$ 1.5 billion in 1999 to US$ 6.8 billion in 2017. It has similarly led to a five-fold increase in UN 
personnel deployed to support peacekeeping activities, from 27,000 military, civilian and police peace operators 
in 1999 to over 110,000 in 2017 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-0 
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they divert resources that could otherwise have assisted the UN capacity to undertake 
complex peace operations, and thereby enhance its credibility. Developing countries, on the 
other hand, have fears that dominance of the UN by major developed powers will benefit their 
own interests. This fear resulted in protracted debates on humanitarian intervention and “a 
general trend among developing countries of opposition to the strengthening of the UN, when 
in fact their need was for the very opposite” (National Defence Coll Stockholm Dept Of 
Operational Studies, 2002, p. 53). 
The centrality of Africa for 21
st
 century UN peace operations is evident
24
. Over the past 
decade, the African Union (AU) has worked towards a coherent continental peace and 
security architecture, including in building the African Standby Force and the African 
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises for the future. The effectiveness of UN peace 
operations in Africa is, however, undermined by the lack of sustained, predictable and flexible 
funding mechanisms to support AU peace support operations (High-Level Independent Panel 
on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 63).  
Furthermore, today’s peace operations are multi-layered. They are not only established for 
maintenance of  peace and security, but also “to facilitate the political process, protect 
civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, 
support the organization of elections as well as to protect and promote human rights and assist 
in restoring the rule of law” (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 3). The more tasks a mission is 
mandated to conduct, “the more diffuse its centres of control, and the greater the probability 
of confused prioritization, contradiction or interference between operations” (Shetler-Jones, 
2008, p. 4). By putting forward all-encompassing peacekeeping mandates and asking these 
missions to uphold peacekeeping principles, the Security Council “may be charging UN 
missions with the impossible task of trying to fulfil their mandate by continuously 
compromising on that same mandate” (Felix da Costa & Peter, 2017, p. 205). Acknowledging 
these challenges, the HIPPO Panel recommended a sequential development of UN mandates 
to provide a greater flexibility in deploying and adapting UN mandates to developments in the 
mission. 
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 In 2015, 62.5 percent of UN peace operations and 87 percent of all uniformed UN troops are in Africa, whilst 
more than 80 percent of the annual peace operation budget is spent on missions in Africa (High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 63).   
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Another distinct feature of modern UN peace operations, most importantly for the intelligence 
community, is the problem of identification and localization of the “enemy”. Distinguishing 
between “terrorist” and “non-terrorist” groups may be difficult given the fluidity of 
allegiances between transnational “terrorist” groups and autochthonous groups with local 
grievances. Belonging to a terrorist group may also be “a seasonal activity, or be driven by 
limited livelihood alternatives”. Labelling individuals or groups as terrorists in itself can be 
used as a political strategy to a conflict (Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 9). 
 
Violent extremism has emerged under the cover of several conflicts, with evolving tactics that 
include social media expertise, regional networks, territorial control, extreme brutality and the 
systematic use of conflict-related sexual violence. In a number of conflict settings, it remains 
unclear whom mediators would engage, or what space there is for mediation efforts. 
Combined, all these factors contribute not only to an increase in the number of conflicts and 
their intractability, but also in some contexts to the “erosion of social cohesion and the 
legitimacy of the State itself” (UN Secretary General, 2015b, p. 2).  
The reinforced focus on protection of the civilian in modern multi-dimensional peace 
operations has allocated military tasks that dovetail with the work of humanitarian agencies 
(Humanitarian Practice Network, 2013, p. 3). Managing flows of displaced people or 
delivering assistance, which both overlap with the mandates and concerns of humanitarian 
organizations, are aligned with obligations towards civilian populations embodied in 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In the eyes of many humanitarian actors, humanitarian 
aid has “become increasingly politicized as it has become incorporated into the stabilization 
agendas of the major Western donors, which have seen militaries undertake humanitarian 
assistance activities to achieve strategic or tactical goals in theatres such as Afghanistan”. 
International militaries have also become increasingly involved in natural disaster response; 
the US military, for instance, has deployed to disaster zones 40 times since 2004. Given this 
increasing military involvement in humanitarian action, there is a growing need for 
humanitarian actors to evaluate how their constructive dialogue with the military can be 
improved (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2013, p. 3). 
 
Following mainly negative experiences, the High-Level Independent Panel believed that UN 
troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations. The Panel recommended 
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that extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize 
or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be “exceptional, time-limited and 
undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the UN mission as a 
whole”. In cases where a parallel force is engaged in offensive combat operations, it is 
important that UN troops maintain a clear division of labor and distinction of roles (High-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 10). 
 
In UN peace operation, the mandate will define ambitions and indicate capabilities and the 
amount of forces needed to address incidents threatening international peace and security.  
Thus, significant legal and political constraints on UN activities arises from the mandate of 
the mission, usually “supplied by the Security Council, and the Status of Mission Agreement 
or the Status of Forces Agreement which the UN normally agrees to with the host state and/or 
the local authorities, including the combatants” (Dorn, 2003, p. 353). Willmot suggests 
including clear references to situational awareness
25
 in future UN mandates. In relation to 
human rights, the UNMISS mandate states that UN should “monitor, investigate, verify and 
report” any violations. The consequences concerning the UNMISS mission provides three 
aspects that are equally important when it comes to situational awareness and intelligence; 
Protection of civilians is becoming more important, UN mandates are more complex and 
multi-dimensional, and, finally, the lineation between civilian humanitarian and military 
actors in UN missions is becoming more difficult to uphold. 
 
Within the UN Charter, there are three chapters of particular interest as the mandates for 
missions are developed - Chapters 6, 7 and 8
26
. Without directly referring to the chapters, 
mandates have a clear reference to the chapters by defining the use of force, capabilities and 
actors invited to ensure compliance with the mandate. Additionally, regional and sub-regional 
organizations are becoming more prominent features in the global peace and security 
landscape, as was foreseen upon drafting Chapter VIII of the UN Charter more than seventy 
years ago. Regional and sub-regional entities bring long-standing relationships, depth of 
understanding, determination and often a willingness to respond. However, they also bring 
                                                 
25
 In most aspects, situational awareness equals Intelligence. Having situational awareness requires gathering and 
processing of information. 
26
 Observer mission is a typical Chapter VI peace operation; Peace Enforcement is a Chapter VII operation, 
whereas Chapter VIII indicates that a regional security organization, e.g. NATO or African Union, can take upon 
responsibility for the operation authorized by the UN. 
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interests, some of which carry potential risks to impartially managing conflicts. In the future, 
the Panel recommends that the UN should embrace a strengthened global and regional 
partnership with partners responding politically and operationally (High-Level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 13).  
At the 2017 European Peace Training Community- seminar in Helsinki, main characteristics 
of contemporary UN peace operations were identified. The attendees highlighted that 
missions (especially in Africa) are increasingly armed with Chapter VII mandates, providing 
a robust mandate to carry out the various dimensions of the mission and protect civilians. As 
mandates become more driven towards protecting civilians, troops also have to become more 
willing to use force (Felix da Costa & Peter, 2017, p. 204). However, an important question 
was not really addressed: Despite the moral and legal obligations of the international 
community, are member states capable and willing to invest economic and human capital to 
defend and sustain a mandate as ambitious as protecting civilians? UN peace operations must 
be developed in the coming years as the USA has communicated a clear intention to reduce its 
UN funding. The result might lead to increased focus on cost efficient preventive efforts 
replacing expensive peacekeeping operations, which will have major impacts on UN 
situational awareness and intelligence concepts. 
 
3.2 Intelligence in Peace Operations 
A post-Cold War look at Intelligence and the UN 
In the post-Cold War era, the question of intelligence had to be addressed as the United 
Nations doubled the number of missions and increased the number of troops deployed in the 
field by a factor of five. The complexity of these operations also increased, with the United 
Nations taking on ambiguous responsibilities in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, far from 
the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring a ceasefire between standing armies. With size 
and difficulty came risk: more peacekeepers were killed in 1993 than in the entire preceding 
decade.  
 
In April of the same year, a Situation Centre was created in the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations to provide a continuous link between senior staff members at UN Headquarters, 
field missions, humanitarian organizations and member states through their diplomatic 
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missions in New York. In addition to monitoring specific operations, it drew upon reports and 
open-source information to provide daily situation reports on all peacekeeping and some 
political and humanitarian missions. An Information and Research Unit was added in 
September 1993, beginning with a single intelligence officer seconded from the United States. 
In 1997, 111 "gratis" officers worked at DPKO; their home countries paid their salaries
27
. By 
the late 1990s this had become a politically contentious issue and the United Nations began 
phasing out the practice in the period 1998–1999, taking with it the Information and Research 
Unit (Chesterman, 2006, p. 5). 
 
The UN experienced several significant failures - responses to conflicts in Rwanda and Sri 
Lanka and attacks against the UN in Baghdad and Mogadishu. With each successive failure, 
member states have expressed consternation at the UN’s poor performance, followed by a 
group of experts mandated to review the UN’s actions. Poor situational awareness has always 
been one of the reasons for failure. In response, the Secretary-General in office has attempted 
to improve the organization’s situational awareness, but has often faced resistance “both 
internally from some departments and agencies and externally from the very member states 
that criticized the UN’s performance” (Willmot, 2017, p. 25).  
 
Concerned about the hypersensitivity of some if its members to the issue, the UN has 
traditionally shied away from openly acknowledging the utility of gathering and using 
intelligence information. Unofficially UN operations have, out of military necessity, gathered 
analyzed and shared information, albeit at a relatively basic level. UN missions have also 
cooperated with certain participating countries in obtaining higher-level intelligence 
information when deemed necessary (Findlay, 2002, p. 368). 
 
The inconsistency of UN peace operations terminology was elaborated in chapter 3.1. 
Following the contested use of the term Intelligence, several substitutes have been used. The 
term Intelligence has been labelled with secrecy reinforced by the Second and the Cold war 
events. Military information, a more politically correct term in the UN, “became the 
dominating feature in UN peace operations, and there was little serious discussion of any 
form of UN intelligence capability for the remainder of the Cold War” (Chesterman, 2006, p. 
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 Seconded officers from France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States formed an “Information and 
Research Unit” (I&R) with ties back to their home intelligence communities (Maceda, 2007, p. 59). 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
31 
5). In the UN context, a range of terms are used by various actors to capture the essence of 
Intelligence
28
, including information, analysis, assessment, intelligence, early warning, and 
information management. However, none of these terms are used consistently (Willmot, 
2017, p. 23). 
 
Following the deadly attack on the UN envoy to Iraq in 2003 – two logic conclusions were 
made; (1) UN must ensure that UN personnel serving in mission are protected, and (2) to 
facilitate the security of UN personnel more information about the adversaries – their 
capabilities and intentions were needed – in other words - Intelligence.  
 
This event paved the way for Intelligence in UN terminology and planning activities. The 
term Joint Mission Analysis Center was introduced in 2003. By now, the JMAC concept has 
been adapted in most UN missions. The development of policies, handbooks and guidelines 
covering the fields of UN Intelligence and JMAC have followed. It is apparent that any 
development of UN intelligence concepts will be heavily shaped by a small group of Western 
nations. They, almost exclusively, have the knowledge, experience and global reach that is 
required. In the UN Situation Centre, 17 of the 24 (by 1994) staff were drawn from Western 
Europe, North America and Australia and generally occupied the senior positions. Procedures 
in the Centre were based on Western practices, while English is spoken and used for all 
written reports. Any extension of the use of technology in intelligence gathering within the 
UN, would most likely reinforce the dominance of Western powers, both practically and 
symbolically (Smith, 2003, p. 262).  
 
As the mandates and operating environments of United Nations peace operations have 
evolved, as have the capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyze 
information. In complex and dangerous environments, where asymmetric and transnational 
threats pose serious dangers to peace operators and negatively impact mandate 
implementation, there is a need for UN peace operation missions to better understand their 
                                                 
28
 The 2014 UN Forces Headquarters Handbook adds to the confusion. The Handbook states that the U-2 Staff 
Branch deals with all matters concerning Military Information (MI) and military security operations within the 
Force HQ. U-2 Branch plans and coordinates the military information/intelligence requirements (DPKO & DFS, 
2014, p. 39). Annex L is the monthly report format. In section 1, the title reads Information/Intelligence update. 
At best this can be understood as a way of introducing and implementing the term Intelligence in UN peace 
operations, at worst a lack of definition and comprehensive UN peace operation intelligence terminology.  
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environment and context and to predict specific threats and opportunities enabling peace 
operators to effectively execute their mandates (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 1). 
Some member states have an interest in influencing the Secretariat’s analysis of the conflict 
and therefore give some of their confidential information to the heads of the units in charge of 
situational awareness. This mainly takes place between people of the same nationality. The 
UN needs to establish more clarity on the legal framework supporting or limiting intelligence 
sharing, particularly when it could have political implications for the mission’s strategy or 
reputational implications for the mission (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 26). 
 
My research has confirmed that the United Nations has, contrary to official policies and 
terms, a rich history of acquiring and interpreting information. Looking at the history of UN 
mandates, the word Intelligence has never been used. Words like investigate, supervise, 
support the implementation of, early warning, protection of civilians, protect as well as safety 
and security
29
 all require information gathering activities in the UN both at the tactical, 
operational and strategic level. So, does the UN have intelligence? 
 
UN Peacekeeping Intelligence 
Classic Western military intelligence doctrine defines information as raw data, whereas 
intelligence is the “end result of processing this raw data and drawing pertinent conclusions”. 
(Johnston, 1997, p. 6). In the UN SG reply to the HIPPO-report, he reaffirmed the need to 
develop “parameters for an information and intelligence framework that can support field 
missions in operating effectively and safely” (UN Secretary General, 2015a, p. 20). Several 
UN Intelligence documents have been developed and most recently the UN Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Policy has been published enabling a more precise discussion relating to UN and 
Intelligence. The DPKO and DFS Policy defines Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI) as “the 
non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed 
mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations 
related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate” (United 
Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 1). 
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 All these word can be found in the UN resolutions relating to UN mission in Mali and South Sudan 
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Clandestine activities, involves “the acquisition of intelligence, conducted in such a way as to 
assure secrecy or concealment of the activities because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent 
with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations”. Such activities are outside the definition of peacekeeping intelligence and shall 
not be undertaken by UN mission entities (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 3). 
 
Analysis within Peacekeeping intelligence shall be “a whole-of-mission process that makes 
full use of all resources available to the mission according to the comparative advantages, 
including expertise in the local situation, languages and cultures; military and police 
intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques” (United 
Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 6). It is intended to (1) support a common operational 
picture, (2) provide early warning of imminent threats and (3) identify risks and opportunities 
(United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 2). 
 
Peacekeeping intelligence shall be stored and shared in a secure manner, ensuring proper 
access for those who require it for decision-making and operational planning. Confidential 
products shall be shared and disseminated on the basis of the need to know and need to share 
concepts, which require that intelligence should be disclosed to mission personnel if access to 
information is required for them to carry out their official duties (United Nations DPKO & 
DFS, 2017, p. 3). Hence, the Policy allows an extensive interpretation concerning matters 
relating to access, which provides personal and not structural and procedural preferences as 
basis for information sharing. 
 
The parameters for the effective, responsible and ethical acquisition of peacekeeping 
intelligence shall be described in the mission’s Peacekeeping Intelligence Support 
Plan(PKSIP). It will describe; 
 
Acceptable and unacceptable tools, techniques and procedures of peacekeeping 
intelligence acquisition by the mission, applicable legal obligations, and 
considerations that shall be undertaken when acquiring intelligence, based on the 
assets available to the mission and in line with operational guidance subordinate to this 
Policy.  
 
The peacekeeping force must make clear to the parties that; 
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Collected intelligence does not reach their adversaries, that the main purpose of this 
intelligence is to facilitate peace negotiations and the successful execution of the 
peacekeeping operation, that it is the right and duty of the peacekeeping force to carry 
out intelligence collection, and finally, that the other parties are subjected to an 
identical scrutiny (Eriksson, 1997, p. 5).  
 
Using the police as a reference: As long as the public knows that the police will not use 
surveillance for blackmail or to pass information about one's business to competitors, it 
accepts that police officers carry out surveillance. Police surveillance is considered a 
prerequisite for effective law enforcement for the good of society (Eriksson, 1997, p. 4). 
However, the PKISP aiming for transparency reveals the oxymoron of confidentiality and the 
need to protect information gathering and sources, which are needed in some UN peace 
operations. 
 
 
Intelligence – layers and types 
Military theoreticians often distinguish between the three levels of analysis: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Applied on intelligence “they denote three things: the levels of 
command that intelligence serves, the kind of decisions it supports, and the levels at which 
intelligence is itself controlled, and the three get horribly confused” (Aid, 2003, p. 172).  
 
Foreign Minister Brahimi and his panel recommended improvements to UN intelligence at the 
tactical, operation, and strategic levels. The report recognized that operationally and tactically, 
enhanced intelligence advances cease-fire monitoring, peace enforcement, and force 
protection. (Maceda, 2007, p. 47). In contemporary operations, however, NATO recognizes 
that  traditional boundaries between the levels of warfare have less relevance in relation to 
intelligence (NATO, 2016, pp. 2-3).  
 
The compression of level does not equal that one level or type of intelligence can address all 
matters adequately. UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy do not provide guidance regarding 
strategic intelligence. The policy refers to strategic planning, direction and guidance and that 
the Intelligence Support Plan (ISP) should “describe the intelligence system supporting the 
mission and identify responsibilities for strategic, operational and tactical intelligence assets 
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that may be assigned to, or provide support to, the mission” (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 
2017, p. 20). 
 
According to NATO strategic intelligence is “required for the formulation of policy, civil-
military planning and the provision of indications and warning, at the national and/or 
international levels” (NATO, 2016, pp. 3-1). The UN collects strategic information at its 
headquarters in New York (mainly the Secretariat with input from member states). Special 
Representatives of the Secretary General, or heads of mission, are evolving the strategic level 
in their interactions with UN headquarters, including with the Security Council and the UN 
Secretariat. 
 
Operational intelligence is required at mission headquarters “to plan the most effective 
deployment of the UN resources in the various sectors and to be aware of the threat posed by 
parties to the conflict. This includes information about the intentions and capabilities of the 
warring parties and the character of the military activities” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 
15). 
 
Tactical intelligence on the local situation is “required for the planning and execution of 
operations at the tactical level,” according to NATO definition (NATO, 2016, pp. 3-1). 
Tactical intelligence or situational awareness of the local situation is required by all 
components of UN missions to carry out their functions, and by unit commanders to be aware 
of shifts in the local area and to carry out military patrols in an effective manner. This is the 
type of intelligence “missing from current UN multidisciplinary peace operations because 
there is no overall system for sharing information an analysis among mission components and 
because troops and police from different contingents have varying levels of experience and 
training in collecting information” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 15). 
 
According to NATO intelligence documents, intelligence can be divided in levels as well as 
the two following types: Basic intelligence “is intelligence, on any subject, which may be 
used as reference material for planning and as a basis for processing subsequent information 
or intelligence”. It is produced as part of routine monitoring or on a contingency basis, for 
example as in the case with Orders of Battle. Current intelligence on the other hand “reflects 
the current situation at either strategic or tactical level” (NATO, 2016, pp. 3-2). It should tell 
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decision-makers why something is relevant for a mission (the so what factor) and include 
predictive assessment about the future. Basic intelligence requires trained, functional and 
dedicated resources to be able to provide the context and backdrop against which current 
intelligence is reviewed. 
 
 
3.3 Organization and Key Actors  
The Security Council establishes UN peace operations, which under the UN Charter is the 
organization with primary responsibility for international peace and security. In each case, a 
new mission must be designed and its components assembled to meet the requirements of that 
particular situation. The UN system is a complex network of entities, comprising 
organizations created by the Charter (e.g., Security Council and Secretariat), subsidiary 
organizations created by the General Assembly (e.g., Human Rights Council), funds and 
programs (e.g., UN Development Program and UN Children’s Fund), specialized agencies 
(e.g., World Health Organization), and related entities (e.g., World Treaty Organization). The 
entities have differing, and in some instances competing, mandates, funding and governance, 
making UN guiding principles and organizational fragmentation difficult to avoid and 
challenging to overcome (Willmot, 2017, p. 60). 
 
In June 2017, the total number of personnel serving on 16 UN peace operations was 112,294. 
The number of uniformed personnel was 95,544, where 80,067 were military. UN civilians 
represented 15,153 individuals. 127 countries contributed with uniformed personnel (United 
Nations, 2017b).  The vast number of people, entities and locations with different cultural 
background and training make situational awareness and common effort challenging. 
Combined, the organizational and national constraints put upon the UN hamper its capability 
to advance the will(s) of the international community. 
 
Planning and execution of UN peace operations involve many actors, both in New York at the 
strategic level as well as national and international entities in the mission area that are critical 
at the operational and tactical level. UN peacekeeping authority, command and control is 
established at three separate but overlapping areas with seamless links between strategic, 
operational and tactical levels as presented in figure 5. In the UN's case, the strategic level 
would equate to UN Headquarters in New York, where the Secretary- General and his staff sit 
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with the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the headquarters of most UN 
organizations. For the UN, the operational level equates to the 'theatre' headquarters of its 
various missions around the world, for example, the old UNPROFOR headquarters in the 
Balkans or UNMISS headquarters in South Sudan. These headquarters are integrated 
civil/military organizations, with a Head of Mission who reports to the Secretary-General in 
New York. Finally, the tactical level comprises of the units on the line, doing the actual 
peacekeeping (Johnston, 1997, p. 8).  To better understand intelligence in UN peace 
operations, the paper will look in some more detail at the actors in the strategic and 
operational levels. 
 
 
Figure 5: UN Peace operations – the levels (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013, p. 35) 
 
The Strategic level 
At the strategic level, there has been several attempts to establish an intelligence entity 
capable of supporting the Secretary General.  As early as 1965, the Office of the Military 
Adviser to the Secretary-General was created. DPKO which is the dominating entity today 
was established in the optimism in the aftermath of the Cold War in 1992 as the strategic 
entity, responsible for “planning, managing, deploying, supporting and, on behalf of the 
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Secretary-General, providing executive direction to all UN peace operations” (Abilova & 
Novosseloff, 2016, p. 20).  
 
Following the suicide truck-bomb attack on the UN Headquarters at the Canal Hotel in 
Baghdad on 19
th
 August 2003, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security 
(UNDSS) was formally established on 1 January 2005. Since that time, the Department has 
been dedicated to support and enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by 
ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other 
emergencies (United Nations Department of Safety and Security, 2017). DSS has a Threat 
and Risk Assessment Service in charge of providing strategic assessments “through regional 
and country-specific threat assessments to support field duty stations and ensure the safety 
and security of all civilian personnel” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 14). To execute their 
task effectively, they need information that in most cases equals the information needed for 
intelligence and planning activities. 
In 2008, Department of Political Affairs (DPA) established a Policy and Mediation Division, 
which has a small analytical unit that provides policy support to field missions. DPA uses 
DPKO’s documents on situational awareness, information collection, crisis management, and 
information analysis to support their work. Within DPKO, the Office of Military Affairs 
(OMA) has an Assessment Team
30
, which comprised of eleven trained intelligence officers. 
Interviewees pointed out that “this team conducts limited outreach, so its products are not 
widely used or even known outside the OMA” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, pp. 20-22). 
 
The UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) emerged from DPKO’s Peacekeeping 
Situation Centre in 2013. It was established with a broad situational awareness mandate, 
intended to support decision makers across the spectrum of UN operational departments and 
agencies. UNOCC represented a concerted effort to bring existing situational awareness 
capacities together, incorporating DPKO and seeking staffing contributions from other 
stakeholders within the UN system. Despite UNOCC has been successful in its 24/7 situation 
monitoring, current information reporting and crisis management support functions, it has 
struggled to fulfil its integrated analysis role. According to Willmot, this is partly due to a 
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 As of July 2016. 
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“lack of departmental cooperation, insufficient authority, and inadequate staffing of its 
analysis capacity” (Willmot, 2017, p. 44) 
 
Based upon the recommendations of the HIPPO report, the Executive Office of the Secretary-
General furthermore created a three-person analysis and planning cell in March 2016. This 
cell has been tasked in particular with improving information exchange across the UN system, 
lifting the overall quality of analysis, and assisting lead departments in securing the resources 
and skills they need to plan effectively. However, the capacity of this cell seems to be very 
limited given the breadth of its tasks (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 21). 
 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is another key actor in the field 
of information gathering in the UN - being the principal administrator of the Humanitarian 
Early Warning System (HEWS). By definition, HEWS attempts to identify crises with 
humanitarian implications. The idea is to “apply multi-sector analysis of indicators, both long-
term and short-term, and combine this with the evaluation of trends and in-depth field-based 
information, supported by an extensive database of base-line information”. This process is 
aimed at “producing accurate and timely information on the likelihood of humanitarian crisis, 
which could be speedily communicated to decision makers at the UN” (Ekpe, 2007, p. 11).  
OCHA has desk officers collecting all information concerning their region from OCHA’s 
field offices to feed into a daily situation report. 
 
Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with its mandate to monitor and 
identify human rights violations worldwide is an important actor with a global outreach. 
Finally, recognizing the information age, the Department of Public Information (DPI) with an 
open source monitoring capability is important as new information sources follow this 
technological advancement and the increased availability of information. 
 
The UN's information sources at the strategic level furthermore include its member states 
(intelligence services), the UN specialized agencies, the media, and non-governmental 
organizations, in addition to its own field personnel. Frequently, governments have been an 
important source of warnings and critical information (Dorn, 2010, p. 278). Nations, UN 
members and particularly troop contributing nations, tend to provide national intelligence 
resources in UN peace operations outside the UN chain of command. 
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In summary, the total number of entities and actors involved in information gathering 
activities in New York at the strategic level is quite impressive. Above, only the key players 
at the strategic have only been briefly presented. However, to fully benefit from the allocated 
resources, structural and procedural improvements must be implemented. In line with the 
HIPPO report, compartmentalization could prevent the UN at the strategic level from making 
the most of the information it possesses.    
 
The Operational level 
The structure of a UN peace operation at the operational level is tailored according to the 
mandate and the mission. There are, however, structural commonalities relating to key actors 
involved in information processing in UN peace operations; A generic structure in integrated 
UN mission will normally consist of the Head of Mission (HoM) which normally is the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and his staff. The Chief of Staff is 
responsible for the JMAC and the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Furthermore, there is one 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) in charge of the political, 
public and legal aspects of the mission. The second DSRSG deals with all matters relating to 
Humanitarian and Residential coordination.  
The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident Coordinator 
/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG RC/HC) is essential in order to facilitate information 
sharing with all the UN entities in a mission. DSRSG/RC/HC, in agreement with the HoM, 
should ensure that the JMAC and relevant UN Country Team (UNCT)/ Human Coordination 
Team (HCT) entities have established methods for sharing information. They furthermore 
agree on the nature of participation of UNCT/HCT members in any regular JMAC 
consultations fora (United Nations, 2015, p. 7). The Force Commander is the commander of 
the Military Component and the Police Commander is responsible for the Police Component, 
both are organizationally aligned with the two DSRSGs. The key players, normally part of the 
Mission Leadership Team (MLT) in multi-dimensional peace operations, are depicted in a 
generic structure in figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Generic UN multi-dimensional peace operation organisation 
 
At the operational level, there are many entities involved in information gathering. The JOC is 
the structure for coordinating operations and crisis response and for sharing information 
among all components of a mission. When properly staffed and organized, it has the 
capability to receive all information collected by field sectors and battalions, analyze it, and 
send it to the JMAC. 
 
Political Affairs Officers should be given the opportunity to contribute to JMAC products in 
order to ensure that political aspects are covered most effectively. Although there should be 
no unwanted duplication between JMAC and the Political Affairs Division (PAD), as their 
respective focus of work is different, “turf issues” may arise. Given the specific role of PAD 
personnel, Theunens believe that integration into the JMAC is not advisable. Still, 
arrangements need to be made to regulate information sharing between PAD and JMAC and 
avoid overlap or information gaps (Theunens, 2017, p. 13)
31
.  
 
The Military Component, under the command of the Force Commander, have developed 
mechanisms to ensure that relevant information is reported up the chain of command to the U-
2 cell. However, the current Deputy JMAC in UNMISS, LtCol Petter Vindheim (see annex 
B), raises concerns about the effectiveness due to communication, computer, intelligence and 
language deficiencies. Within the second uniformed component, the Police Division’s 
                                                 
31
 The possible merging of DPA and DPKO into DPO would facilitate a closer cooperation in–theatre as well as 
at the strategic level in New York. 
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Mission Management and Support Section (PD-MMSS) shall share relevant information with 
mission JMACs (United Nations, 2015, p. 6).  
 
All matters relating to security and safety is the responsibility of the fielded UNDSS entity. 
Every mission will have a Designated Official who is the sole accountable authority in the 
security management arrangements. A Security Management Team (SMT) will be established 
in each country to facilitate this collaboration (United Nations, 2006, pp. 2-5). The SMT 
reports to the Designated Official who normally will be the DSRSG/RC/HC.  
 
As when it comes to the Civilian Component, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) is 
UN’s highest level inter-agency coordination and decision-making body. The United Nations 
Resident Coordinator, the designated representative of the UN Secretary General, leads it. 
The Resident Coordinator in most missions equals the DSRSG who is dual hatted as the 
Humanitarian Coordinator. The UNCT drives activities at the country level and allows for all 
UN entities with activities in an operation “to work as a team in formulating common 
positions on strategic issues, ensuring coherence in action and advocacy” (High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 38). Fielded UN entities coordinates with 
other UN entities in the field, but reports to the strategic level in accordance with their UN 
superstructure.  
 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have usually a vast footprint in most multi-
dimensional UN peace operations. Looking at the recent conflicts and supported by the 
interview with Karin Christoffersen (see annex B) NGO scarcely use OCHA to coordinate 
and facilitate exchange of information. NGOs mainly, if they do report anything from the 
field to anyone but their donors, use the online password protected NGO-forums. As 
peacebuilding starts, however, even OCHA coordinating role tends to recede into the 
background, and no single organization is facilitating collecting and disseminating of 
information. Even when data are shared, the level of detail often is not sufficient to achieve 
effective coordination. Furthermore, data on impacts or outcomes is exceedingly scarce 
(Robertson & Olson, 2012, p. 11). 
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NGOs operating in an UN peace operation are tied to the strains of their donors, their history 
in the area and local authorities. Currently, using South Sudan as an example, there are 96 
national NGOs divided on more than 1323 clusters
32
 and locations. There are another  
107 International NGOs divided on 1811 clusters and locations
33
. This represents a massive 
humanitarian footprint vastly surpassing the military that is normally located in fewer 
locations with more troops.  
 
UN Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) normally provide national intelligence capabilities 
in order to ensure the safety of their troops. Some because they do not believe the UN 
information gathering and safety mechanisms are sufficient to protect their troops, others 
because they have national interests in the region. Some countries make sure that individuals 
within UN missions report back to their capital concerning matters of national interest, thus 
making trust a major concern in many peace operations. LtCol Vindheim stated that, even 
within the JMAC, trust is an issue and that alternative “national lines of communication” limit 
the willingness to share information between civilian and military colleagues assigned to the 
same mission and unit.  
 
Media and social media represent sources of information in UN peace operations as well as 
being a risk to the legitimacy of UN missions if troops and actions deviate from the mandate 
and international law.  
 
The potential sources of information for the JMAC are many. In figure 6, the key entities 
mentioned are listed
34
. From the figure, however, it proves vital to report and merge 
information from the Humanitarian entities with the “uniformed sector” (represented by the 
JMAC) to create a comprehensive situational awareness.  
 
 
                                                 
32
 A cluster is a UN categorization of different NGO focus areas and sectors, e.g. Food Security and Livelihoods.  
33 All numbers are retrieved from http://southsudanngoforum.org/3w/#2017 on 11 October 2017. 
34
 The tactical level has not been elaborated on as it would mean going too much into details. 
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Figure 7: Key Information Processing Actors in UN peace operations 
 
 
 
3.4 The JMAC concept 
 
One of the things that makes the concept of UN intelligence an interesting object to explore is 
the restrictions imposed on it, primarily by the oxymoron of transparency and confidentiality. 
The multinational nature of the organization limits how the organization can gather, analyze 
and disseminate information within a mission. Furthermore, the UN Charter, particularly 
Article 2(7) on domestic jurisdiction, and the principles of state sovereignty, forbid the UN 
from collecting and analyzing information on member states and violation of their 
sovereignty. There is, however, an exception to this rule; chapter VII of the Charter, allowing 
multinational intervention.  Broadly interpreted, this includes collection and analysis of 
relevant information with respect to threats to peace and security (Ekpe, 2007, p. 3). 
 
Despite the obstacles deriving from the charter, the development of JOC and JMAC concepts 
were driven from the challenges experienced in the field. Military personnel realized 
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that military intelligence capabilities could not fulfil the entire information requirements of 
senior mission leaders. Major General Dallaire, the UN Force Commander in Rwanda during 
the civil war, pointed out that “it is this type of intelligence [operational] which is absolutely 
essential to the force commander in order to enable him to fulfil his mandate”. General 
Dallaire furthermore argued that “the UN's primary [intelligence] requirement is for 
operation[al] intelligence” (Johnston, 1997, p. 8).  
 
As Military Advisor to the Secretary General, Maj Gen Cammaert pushed the idea of a JMAC 
“as a central location for information to be received, analyzed, evaluated, and appropriately 
disseminated” (Maceda, 2007, p. 52). In late 2003, the UN’s Handbook on Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations briefly described the JMAC’s purpose: “The JMAC is responsible 
for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and 
reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and 
force commander’s decision-making process” (United Nations, 2003, p. 69).  The latter 
element is important for analyzing the performance and role of the JMAC. The UN started to 
form JMACs by 2005 with trial versions in ONUB (Burundi) and MONUC (Congo) (Maceda, 
2007, p. 53). Because JMACs report to civilian SRSGs, civilian analysts lead the JMACs, 
although they may have a substantial military component. In 2006, a policy directing all 
missions to establish a JOC and JMAC was issued.  
 
The JMAC concept has its origins in a military model of integration developed by NATO for 
the purposes of coordinating joint operations. It was developed in a policy process initially led 
by the military division of DPKO, with support from UNDSS and from advocates in the 
military and security departments. Early organization chart drafts for the JMAC envisioned a 
substantial and robust JMAC staffing with representatives from all relevant information and 
intelligence entities included in the mission (Maceda, 2007, p. 79). However, the DPKO 
policy directive covering JMAC depicts an integrated peacekeeping mission with liaison to 
the other parts of the UN, contrary to a model integrating the mission and UN funds, 
programs and agencies – which is the definition of ‘integrated’ in the Secretary-General’s 
note of guidance of 2006 (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7).  
Recognizing the nature of modern UN peace operations all UN missions shall have a capacity 
to undertake multi-source integrated analysis and predictive assessments. Multi-dimensional 
peace operations shall establish a JMAC to meet these analysis requirements. In other mission 
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settings, the Head of Mission (HoM), in consultation with UNHQ, will determine whether the 
establishment of a JMAC is necessary in relation to the mission’s mandate, capacities and 
operational environment (United Nations, 2015, p. 2).  
 
According to the 2014 UN Force Headquarters Handbook, the JMAC generates medium to 
long-term integrated analytical products, providing the Head-of-Mission and Mission 
Leadership Team (MLT) with an in-depth “understanding of issues and trends, their 
implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of crosscutting issues and 
threats that may affect the mission’s mandate implementation”. Enhanced situational 
awareness and understanding supports the ability of senior mission leadership to identify, 
prevent, mitigate and respond to threats and opportunities to mandate implementation. The 
JMAC is not a decision-making body and does not replace existing management, command or 
decision-making structures at any level in the mission (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 15). 
 
JMACs are entities established at Mission Headquarters level and are part of the Office of the 
HoM. Chief of Staff (CoS) and the Chief JMAC supports HoM in developing mission-wide 
instructions, setting out the mandate of the JMAC and its relationship to other mission 
components (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). JMACs must be able to “effectively incorporate 
political, civil affairs, protection, military, security, rule of law, DDR, electoral, gender, 
humanitarian, development, human rights, natural resources and any other mandate related 
perspectives in mission-wide information collection and analysis” (United Nations, 2015, p. 
5). 
 
The JMAC is normally co-located with the JOC. Whereas JOCs focus on day-to-day 
situational awareness, the JMAC generates integrated analysis and predictive assessments. 
Following the JMAC Policy from 2015, the work of JMACs should focus on “strategic, 
operational and contingency planning and it contributes to overall crisis management through 
the provision of integrated threat assessments and other analytical products and services” 
(United Nations, 2015, p. 3). However, experiences from Haiti shows that a JMAC can be 
successfully utilized at the tactical level to solve operational problems. 
 
For effective mandate implementation, it is important that, from the outset, clear coordination 
and information exchange protocols are established within the mission, between the JMAC 
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and other mission components, as well as other stakeholders. The creation of an “information 
community” as a functional network linking the JMAC and different mission assets that 
contribute to providing understanding is a good practice for ensuring the efficient and 
effective use of resources (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 6). 
 
The JMAC should, according to UN policy, receive information from all components. For 
many reasons this has proven difficult in reality. Ramjouè presented the challenge of 
information flow in his 2011 article (figure 7). The JMAC has many potential source from 
whom they can received information, but only one body receives their reports – the Head of 
Mission normally the SRSG.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: JMAC sources of information and output recipients (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 6). 
 
The release authority of the JMAC products rests with the SRSG – a civilian with limited 
intelligence background that might hamper information sharing. Whereas JMAC products are 
usually only shared with a small number of clients, “procedures need to be put in place so that 
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other mission components can also benefit from the JMAC’s work, and create the conditions 
for two way information sharing” (Theunens, 2017, p. 7). 
 
The JMAC staffing is a mixture of military, police and civilians. A minimum number of 
civilian JMAC staff members in large missions provides continuity to the JMAC contrary to 
military and police colleagues, who are subject to 6 or 12-monthly staff rotations (Ramjoué, 
2011, p. 5). A fully implemented JMAC in a UN multi-dimensional peace operation would 
ideally consist of individuals representing all components as well as some representatives 
from the UNCT. However, in reality JMAC in UN missions tend to vary in both staffing and 
organization
35
. Not all missions have fully implemented a JMAC, and UN missions with a 
sensitive political situation, like UNTSO in the Middle East, have no JMAC. Still, some 
commonalties in the staffing are included in a generic major configured JMAC as depicted in 
figure 9 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Generic JMAC Structure, source UN DPKO (2010), annexes to JMAC Guidelines 
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 The JMAC staffing has varied from 30 in MINUSTA (Haiti), 17 in UNAMID (South Sudan), 8 in UNIFIL 
(Lebanon) to none in UNMIK (Kosovo). 
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4 UN and Intelligence – Challenges and 
Impact 
 
4.1 UN and Intelligence – Experiences in South Sudan and 
Mali 
Previous chapter provided a historical description of UN peace operations as well as 
Intelligence, whereas the following subchapter will provide examples and an operation 
specific understanding of intelligence challenges and their impacts in two ongoing UN 
missions; UNMISS in South Sudan and MINUSMA in Mali. These operations, in relation to 
UN Intelligence, have been subject to field research providing updated, relevant and detailed 
knowledge about the mission. Examples will provide an understanding of the key challenges 
the UN faces in the Intelligence domain.  
 
South Sudan  
On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the newest country in the world, truly a multi-
dimensional challenge for the UN. The birth of the Republic of South Sudan followed the 
culmination of a six-year peace process. The crisis, which broke out in South Sudan in 
December 2013, reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate.  
 
In UNMISS, the need to know principle seemed to guide all parts of the organization. 
According to Nordlie and Lindboe the principle was seemingly issued directly from the SRSG 
(Nordli & Lindboe, 2017). Although sometimes a necessity, the need to know principle can be 
overemphasized, causing more harm than good. When several potential recipients of 
intelligence products are omitted – even those with an obvious need for the intelligence – the 
principle and procedures about security and classification are not helpful. The current deputy 
of JMAC in UNMISS confirms there are still challenges with regards to information sharing 
and trust both in general for the mission and internally within the JMAC. Firstly, this points to 
a serious cultural challenge. Secondly, it furthermore introduces a lack of adequate training of 
UN personnel, procedures and a robust IT- architecture, and finally the key impact the lack of 
trust in security mechanisms for handling of classified information between mission entities. 
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The need to know principle can lead to a system in which actors contribute with information 
to be processed, but receive little, if anything, in return. According to Nordli and Lindboe, 
recent information gained from field research in UNMISS paints a picture of information 
sharing mainly going upwards, and not sideways or downwards. External organizations fed 
their information into the JMAC, which only shared parts of its information with other entities 
such as political affairs and the J-2. The JMAC forward its products to the Deputy SRSG 
Political and the SRSG; less is shared with the rest of the MLT. (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, pp. 
22-24). Thus, UNMISS does have the need for a responsible entity to facilitate intelligence 
sharing at the operational level. Their findings indicate that UNMISS has;  
 
A need for structured intelligence processing in all of its intelligence entities. This 
requires competence standards (education), clearer intelligence dialogues, CCIRM, 
and proper use of all the information that already exists in the mission. Lastly, it 
requires an emphasis on a need to share, as well as a need to know. This would result 
in wider dissemination of products where possible and appropriate, to ensure that all 
possible recipients of intelligence receive the information they need to do their jobs as 
efficiently as possible (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 24). 
 
Civil and military peculiarities generally discourages information sharing and co-location of 
military and humanitarian actors in complex emergencies. In South Sudan, contrary to this 
tradition and recognizing the grave security situation, some multi-mandated UN agencies 
have chosen to co-locate with UNMISS both in Juba and in certain state capitals (Civil-
Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 4). Information sharing between UN mission entities and 
the humanitarian actors is critical, but has made some important improvements. This can be 
related to that the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and UNMISS jointly developed 
“Guidelines for the Coordination between Humanitarian Actors and the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan,” endorsed by the HCT on 6 December 2013. This document 
indicates that “strategic coordination between the humanitarian community and UNMISS 
should be assured by the existence of a triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC,” and that 
“humanitarians actors are not tasked by UNMISS, and vice versa. Taking into account 
different organizational approaches and mandates, the guidelines also acknowledge that; 
 
Coordination between humanitarian actors and UNMISS on protection of civilians 
(PoC) issues is essential to assure the timely two-way information exchange and early 
warning, consultative  analysis, prioritization of geographical and thematic issues, and 
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distinction of activities, taking into account different organizational approaches and 
mandates” (International Organization for Migration South Sudan, 2016, p. 19). 
 
A Civil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG), chaired by OCHA and attended by both 
humanitarian actors and relevant UNMISS sections, provides policy and operational advice 
on civil-military matters and UNMISS coordination issues to the Humanitarian Coordinator 
and the Humanitarian Country Team (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 4). In 2013, 
OCHA’s engagement with UNMISS took place through the Joint Operations Center (JOC) as 
the primary focal point at state level (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 4). 
 
Mali 
On 25 April 2013, the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 2100, which established 
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 
MINUSMA
36
 has entered history as one of the deadliest missions in the history of United 
Nations (UN) and is of particular interest as it is the “first time a multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation has conducted operations in a theatre with on-going counter-terrorist 
operations” (Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 1). 
 
Following increased pressure for UN peace operations to have greater ability to deal with the 
threat of targeted attacks from armed groups, the UN Secretariat in 2012 called on member 
states to help provide an “intelligence capacity” to MINUSMA. In response, the Netherlands 
and other European countries, provided the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), 
which is the most robust intelligence structure put in a UN mission to date (Abilova & 
Novosseloff, 2016, p. 8). Simultaneously, the very name of this missions adds questions and 
confusion to what kind of chapter VII mandated operation MINUSMA is; Multi-dimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission. As there was no peace agreement, there was no peace to 
keep. Does this kind of operation, a stabilization mission, represent a new branch of UN 
Peace Operations, or having in mind the inconsistency of UN terminology; are we still talking 
about Peacekeeping operations? The changing nature of UN Peace Operation requires an 
overarching conceptual framework to better understand the evolving nature of UN Peace 
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 MINUSMA consisted of approximately 500 international civilians, 120 UN volunteers, over 1,000 policemen, 
and approximately 9,000 soldiers. The military troops originated from 41 different countries, including Europe 
(Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands), Africa (Egypt, Gambia, Niger, Senegal), and several others, 
including China and Bangladesh (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 5). 
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Operations. Such a framework will have consequences for the development of UN 
Intelligence as the current Policy is only related to UN Peacekeeping.  
 
In terms of practices on the ground, MINUSMA has been a laboratory for exploration 
and innovation in UN peace operations. When deployed, it included various 
capabilities for confronting asymmetric threats on the ground, drawing on Western 
experiences from counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in e.g. Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and established the first explicit intelligence cell in a UN peacekeeping mission
37
. 
Due to national and classification constraints, the ASIFU did not provide UN mission 
leadership with all the required quantitative trend analyses, scenario-based documents, 
geospatial information-management tools, and network analysis, despite having the necessary 
tools to do so (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 23). 
 
The ASIFU controlled many high-tech sensors, well-educated intelligence personnel, and a 
state-of-the-art information technology, including databases and command systems. These 
elements made the ASIFU a unique asset within the context of UN missions. While some 
political as well as military leaders believe that the ASIFU might be part of future UN peace 
operations, others warn that it might be controversial at best and could potentially intensify 
the divide among military, development, and humanitarian personnel. Moreover, integrating a 
high-tech intelligence capacity within a low-tech organization such as MINUSMA is likely to 
pose serious challenges (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 4). The technological gap does not only 
relate to sensors, communication capabilities and databases.  
 
To achieve the intelligence ideal, a seamless exchange of information, trained and 
professional intelligence operators must use standardized intelligence tools to manage and 
analyze information, combined with a common taxonomy to facilitate exchange and 
translation of information between all UN (and non) entities. However, acknowledging the 
challenges that NATO has in properly addressing these issues, the question is if it is realistic 
for the UN to aim for a seamless exchange of information. Besides cultural challenges, there 
are serious technological challenges that must be appropriately addressed in relation to 
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 “An All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) is a military intelligence concept with its origins in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan” 
(Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 7). 
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collection, analysis and dissemination. The ownership of information and the national 
constraint imposed on information in theater is another crucial aspect that must be addressed 
upon defining the ambitions of intelligence in UN peace operations. 
 
As NATO or UN missions are planned, intelligence preparations start with a baseline on 
which intelligence requirements, estimates and products can be planned and measured. For 
the UN, these could include an assessment of the warring factions’ deployments, movements, 
and firing incidents, among others. “A clearly defined baseline provides a reference point for 
assessing developments in the field or the threat to peace, such as breaking a ceasefire 
agreement” (Ekpe, 2007, p. 17). Developing such a baseline, or according to traditional 
military terminology an Order of Battle, requires dedicated analysts prior to an operations 
start. A JMAC cannot be operating effectively from the start, if scrambled on an ad hoc basis 
once the international community blow the whistle. JMAC personnel must be trained on 
standardized intelligence tools and procedures must be adapted prior to each mission. 
Recruitment of individuals capable to understand the complex multi-dimensional environment 
is essential. To avoid the ad hoc nature, the JMAC would benefit significantly from having an 
overarching intelligence structure at the strategic level. 
 
MINUSMA provides a very interesting example of conflicting roles, responsibility and 
accountability. The deployment of the ASIFU was not founded on a clear division of labor 
between the ASIFU and the JMAC. No formal coordination mechanisms was in place, 
leading to some duplication of work and optimizing conditions for personal rivalry and turf 
wars. Rivalry led the two organizations to act “on their own best interest, and cooperation 
developed a quid pro quo character”. “Close ties between the first Dutch ASIFU commander 
and the Dutch SRSG at that time further fueled JMAC’s anxiety towards ASIFU” (Rietjens & 
Waard, 2017, p. 20). Despite these challenges mechanisms were developed, again inspired by 
NATO practices, making the Joint Coordination Board (JCB) the main actor overseeing the 
intelligence cycle by synchronizing and de-conflicting requests and analysis among all 
components (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 24). In general, accountable leaders with 
incentives to act are essential to define roles and responsibilities whenever a turf war is 
imminent.  
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The ASIFU was not the only entity to which the JMAC needed structural and procedural 
clarifications. The JMAC and J-2 were co-located at the UN compound in Juba. The JMAC 
was considerably larger than the J-2, both in size and in its impact on mission decision-
making. The co-location was to promote cooperation and information sharing between the 
two intelligence entities, but the relationship between them was characterized by a sense of 
rivalry. According to Nordli and Lindboe, informants from both the J-2 and the JMAC 
confirmed that the JMAC maintained a database of information that was continuously 
updated, but not shared with J-2. One interviewee stated that “the J-2 and the JMAC are only 
partly able to bridge the gap between the tactical and the strategic level of the conflict.” In 
practice, the J-2 dealt with what could be described as the tactical level of intelligence, whilst 
the JMAC focused on the strategic level, leaving the operational level of intelligence in peril 
of marginalization. (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 21). 
 
A range of recipients of intelligence, including personnel within the civil affairs division, UN 
department of safety and security, political affairs, the military column and a number of UN 
programs, had limited access to products from the J-2 and the JMAC. Common to all was” a 
conviction that they ought to receive more, particularly from the JMAC. The JMAC’s 
products were not even shared with all members of the MLT – they were tailored for every 
recipient” (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 23). Lack of information sharing procedures at the 
operational level as well as intelligence culture are important take-away from Nordli and 
Lindboe regarding UN intelligence challenges.   
 
OCHA coordinated information sharing with humanitarian actors, and the J-2 was allowed to 
send a representative to coordination meetings. One attendee from the J2 described: “Some of 
them are very willing to provide us with information. We try to build trust and relationships in 
these settings.” Interviewees further stressed the informal way on how information was 
received – commonly not through structured channels or processes. One interviewee noted 
that: “the system works as long as it does not work as intended. [I]nformation collection and 
product dissemination is mostly done through informal channels that are reliant on personal 
relations.” (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 22).  
  
The enforcement of need to know principle is often necessary for a number of reasons, 
including the need to protect the source of the original information or the need to protect 
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future operations including force personnel (Dorn, 1999). This is particularly relevant to 
tactical intelligence products, where handling specific names and identities is inevitable. 
However, “the need to know is less relevant for operational and strategic level intelligence 
products such as analysis of conflict drivers and population sentiments”. This is because such 
analysis products are easy to sanitize by omitting specific names of sources and other specific 
information which is likely to be less relevant at the operational and strategic level (Nordli & 
Lindboe, 2017, p. 28).  
 
Frustrating, especially for military officers
38
, is the absence of intelligence procedures in UN 
missions and the JMAC. Western intelligence methodology developed with the experiences in 
the Balkans and Afghanistan is not used systematically. Lacking systematic forms of 
information collection results in a situation whereby having information does not necessarily 
result in its use. This is because information sharing based on personal relationships may lead 
to irregular intelligence production. Findings indicate that this may represent one of the great 
challenges concerning the access to information in UNMISS today – using what is already 
freely available in a systematic manner aligned with good intelligence procedures (Nordli & 
Lindboe, 2017, p. 22). 
 
Furthermore, OSINT proved a very promising intelligence tool worth investing in. Not only 
for the OSINT team, but for most of the sensors, cultural competencies and language skills 
turned out to be very important. The extent to which the ASIFU’s analysts and operators 
mastered these varied considerably. In many cases, soldiers lacked awareness of the 
complexity of the conflict, the history of Mali, and the ethnic sensitivities involved (Rietjens 
& Waard, 2017, p. 16). 
 
 
 
4.2 UN Peace Operations Intelligence - Summary 
Challenges and Impact 
Focusing on intelligence in the most recent UN mission, represented by Mali and South 
Sudan, some key challenges with various impact on UN Intelligence capability stand out. 
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 Deputy JMAC confirmed that the logical sequence from Priority Intelligence Requirements cascading into 
Specific Intelligence Requirements, and then Essential Elements of Information is lacking. 
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Table 3 summarizes the key challenges and the impacts of UN and JMAC intelligence 
challenges as discussed in chapter 4.1. The findings found the basis for chapter 5 that will 
investigate if the JMAC can succeed in mitigating UN intelligence challenges. 
 
 
Table 3: UN Peace Operation Intelligence Key Challenges and Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
5 UN Peace Operation Intelligence 
Challenges – JMAC Limitations or 
Possibilities 
 
5.1 Introduction 
“The United Nations has no intelligence”, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
memorably noted following the organization’s operation in the Balkans in 1993.  However, 
the “evolving responsibilities of the United Nations in peace operations have led to periodic 
consideration of its capacity to gather, or at least receive, intelligence” (Chesterman, 2006, p. 
4).  
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Throughout literature and this paper, there is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is 
being asked of UN peace operations today and what they are able to deliver
39
. This gap can be 
– must be – narrowed to ensure that the Organization’s peace operations are able to respond 
effectively and appropriately to the challenges to come (High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations, 2015, p. 7). 
 
In chapter 4, the key challenges of UN Intelligence in peace operations have been detailed. 
Following these findings, this chapter will investigate how and the likelihood that the JMAC, 
according to UN documents and practices, can succeed in mitigating the challenges. The UN 
Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle will frame the discussion as to what extent the JMAC is able 
to mitigate these challenges.  
 
 
5.2 Tasking (Direction) 
Lack of Authority and responsibility 
Critical in any multinational and military organizations are regulations concerning 
accountability and responsibility. The first element of the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence 
Cycle is tasking and the need to provide direction to the mission intelligence structure. 
According to UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, the Head of Mission is “ ultimately 
accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations for the mission’s execution of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle” (United 
Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 13). Considering the close ties that the UN Country Team 
entities have with their New York offices and the different mandates as well as funding 
mechanisms, the Head of Mission in UN missions has more of a coordinating and facilitating 
role than managing a common unity of effort.  
 
To better support the members of the UN country team, the 2003 Handbook states that the 
SRSG should “be informed of their priorities, identify complementarities, draw upon their 
expertise and work that knowledge supporting the overall political strategy”. The SRSG can 
support the agencies, and the UN agencies can provide the SRSG with “in-depth knowledge 
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 The Secretariat currently manages 13 sanctions regimes, 16 peacekeeping operations, and nine special political 
missions, and there are 131 UN country teams delivering humanitarian and development assistance in 161 
countries (Willmot, 2017, p. 25). 
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of the local situation and their vast networks of local contacts and may implement important 
elements of the mandate, such as humanitarian and developmental assistance” (United 
Nations, 2003, p. 17). However, for various reasons accountability and responsibility remain a 
challenge. 
 
As the entity, on behalf of the Head of Mission, responsible for collating information in 
peacekeeping missions, the JMAC knows that when they request UN entities for information 
they are imposing on their time. The JMAC has “historically had little beyond their thanks to 
offer in return, save the hopeful notion that the benefit of wiser integrated management 
decisions will trickle down” (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7). The 2015 UN JMAC Policy 
addresses this issue as “ all mission components, in particular relevant analytical entities, shall 
put in place mechanisms to share timely and accurate information with the JMAC to enable 
the production of its integrated analysis and predictive assessments” (United Nations, 2015, p. 
3). A commitment by all actors to contribute toward the achievement of common objectives is 
fundamental, but it does not arise naturally, and “building it requires trust and managers 
understanding and commitment” (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7).  
 
At the very heart of this discussion, acknowledging that intelligence is interactive and must be 
integrated in operation, Johnston claimed that intelligence must be able to task collection 
assets (Johnston, 1997, p. 6). Even though the JMAC Policy makes a giant leap in ensuring 
that the JMAC can receive information and provide a comprehensive analysis and support the 
Mission Leadership, there are no mechanisms to ensure a transformation from asking to 
tasking. However, there are exceptions; In MINUSTAH (Haiti) the JMAC had authority to 
“task the tactical elements of the mission though these units had limited intelligence 
collection skills” (Gentry, 2010, p. 27). Unless the UN can define a central authority, both at 
the operational and strategic level, with clear responsibility, authority and accountability, 
coherent UN efforts involving intelligence would prove extremely challenging (Willmot, 
2017, p. 61). 
 
So where does this leave the JMAC? The JMAC is furthermore identified as the hub for 
operational intelligence. The UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy and the JMAC Policy only 
encourage cooperation between various UN components. This is however a one dimensional 
perspective on UN intelligence. Haidi Willmot just recently investigated the UN capability to 
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provide a comprehensive situational awareness in UN peace operations. Willmot findings 
indicate, knowing the UN system for years, that “existing situational awareness entities are 
not joined up into a coherent whole. Although interagency decision-making and coordination 
fora exist, they are seldom fed by systematically gathered and analyzed information. There is 
no overarching framework pulling the system together, harnessing the information”. 
“Responsibilities are diffuse and accountability unclear” (Willmot, 2017, p. 14 and 61). 
Willmot`s brutal verdict of UN capability to gather and process information, indicates that 
there is a critical need to ensure a “line of command” concerning all matters relating to 
intelligence from the tactical to the strategic level. The UN cannot jeopardize Intelligence 
falling into an abyss of uncertainty and fractured responsibility.  
 
UN Policy states that the head of Mission is responsible for the functioning of UN 
intelligence system in a mission. Abilova and Novosseloff claim that one of the main 
obstacles to a functioning intelligence cycle in UN peace operations is that senior leadership 
is unaware of the intelligence capabilities at its disposal. They are not trained or practiced in 
giving intelligence direction, or unwilling or unable to improve coordination among different 
structures (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 15).  Thus, to address the root causes, there are 
convincing arguments why the JMAC cannot fully address the challenges relating to authority 
and responsibility at the operational level without a robust, responsible and accountable 
strategic intelligence entity. 
 
National constraints 
UN member states have repeatedly imposed informal caveats with the full knowledge of UN 
Headquarters, through their Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). MOUs tend to limit 
national contingents and what operations they will undertake. Units sometimes have to make 
the limitations clear to the Force Commander “often leading to a restrictive interpretation of 
their rules of engagement” (Guehenno & Sherman, 2009, p. 6). This confined motivation to 
contribute in UN peace operations equals the national caveats we find in NATO operations 
for the last 25 years. Any proposals to enhance the capacity of international organizations to 
use intelligence must therefore be tempered by the reality that “most states’ participation in 
such organizations is geared more towards gathering intelligence than sharing it” 
(Chesterman, 2006, p. 4). 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
60 
 
Transparency is a major obstacle to effective UN intelligence (Maceda, 2007, p. 9). In the 
Security Council, the five permanent members continue to look to each other and their own 
intelligence networks for “the truth”, which they consider more reliable and less sanitized 
than information from the Secretariat. The remaining ten elected members of the Council 
generally do not have extensive intelligence networks, and thus rely heavily on the Secretariat 
for information and analysis to be able to participate actively in Council decision-making. 
“Security Council members not only need better information and analysis from the 
Secretariat, but they need it to be more frank and timely to effectively inform their decisions” 
(Willmot, 2017, p. 28). 
 
To better understand national caveats, it is important to analyze the situation from the 
perspective of the nations. Eriksson provides an example; the intelligence requirements, as 
determined by the UN system, are not always accepted by the national contingents. A 
government may “interpret the mandate differently, a contingent may wish to avoid disputes 
with one of the parties involved in the conflict, or control by foreigners may be unacceptable 
to the contingent in question”. A national contingent commander could occasionally decide 
that the UN's intelligence is insufficient for the safety of the unit and initiate independent 
intelligence operations (Eriksson, 1997, p. 7). Recent experiences from Mali, in which the 
Norwegian contingent commander, as holder of the red flag posed limitation on the use of the 
Norwegian C-130 aircrafts to the dismay of the Force Commander, serve as an example of the 
challenging middle ground between security concerns for national troops and upholding the 
UN mandate. 
 
Occasionally, troop-contributing countries may have interests and ties that go against the 
explicit aims of the operation. “Such nations will hesitate to supply the operation with any  
intelligence and nor will they wish to see efficient G2/S2 cells or units” (Eriksson, 1997, p. 6). 
However, the institutionalization of JMACs is due in part to the proven need for operational 
intelligence, and an acceptance on the part of member states that a mission-level JMAC does 
not threaten sovereignty. A JMAC is, according to policy, established after the mission has 
started and operations focus on the mission area. The natural limitations of the JMAC area 
and tasks prevent neighboring countries with interests fearing that the JMAC “spying” on 
them. The sovereignty principle as we know from the Peace of Westphalia and from the UN 
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Charter is a key obstacle to improve the overall ability of the UN to perform intelligence 
functions in support of peace operations. Hence, intelligence provides “the underpinnings of 
force protection, which is a key factor in military deployment decisions, especially among 
casualty-averse Western states” (Maceda, 2007, p. 61). 
 
The UN has legitimate concerns about sharing information with external actors while 
maintaining the independence of its own system. However, it can do this while being open to 
the receipt of information from a diverse range of partners and nations. The UN should be 
open to receiving intelligence from any member state willing to share, but there should not be 
undue dependence upon it, and the information should be evaluated in the same manner as 
any other (Willmot, 2017, p. 64). “ Irrespective of this dichotomy, information sharing by 
member states continues to be determined by national considerations rather than the 
information needs of the UN” or the JMAC (Theunens, 2017, p. 2). Based upon the recent 
experiences with intelligence in NATO operations, there are obvious reasons why nations will 
remain pivotal to information sharing.  
 
Western nations consider it absurd to send troops to a sensitive area without the capability to 
analyze the situation properly. They furthermore cooperate in unofficial "clubs," often 
founded on traditional alliances. "Membership" is earned by proof of the ability to contribute 
with useful information and capability for handling the information in a responsible way. 
Intelligence sometimes functions as a form of currency – a fungible item that may be 
exchanged for other intelligence. The value of any currency, however, depends on its scarcity 
(Chesterman, 2006, p. 13). The exchange of information and the release authority of 
operational and sometimes tactical intelligence is often retained at the national and strategic 
level. The interrelationship between tactical capabilities and national strategic analysis 
capabilities has sometimes prevented tactical units from contributing with relevant 
information for the good of the mission. This poses challenges for the JMAC at the 
operational level knowing that national strategic intelligence is exchanged between national 
intelligence services.  Exchange of strategic intelligence in UN peace operations could be 
more adequately addressed with a strategic UN “intelligence body” that can canalize and 
facilitate information sharing between national intelligence services.  
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The nations, not the UN, are dictating the ambitions relating to intelligence. Intelligence is a 
matter of national concern at the strategic level. This is the main reason why nations have 
been reluctant to allow a strategic capability of the UN. Contradictory, the same nations are 
the ones not enabling the UN to have a strategic intelligence entity that can “connect the 
dots”. The JMAC challenges of national caveats and sharing of intelligence is thus something 
that needs to be addressed at the strategic level in the UN and cannot be solved in isolation by 
introducing a operational concept, which is what the JMAC and UN Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Policy is.  
 
Rivalry and “turf wars” 
 
JMAC produced ‘target packages’ with the required information for precision 
operations and quick arrests. One target was a gangster, Zachari, who had killed two 
Jordanian peacekeepers in November 2006. The JMAC target package included 
detailed maps showing the positions of tables, doors, kitchen and staff in that 
restaurant (Gentry, 2010, p. 23). 
 
Every UN peace operation is unique in the sense that people, ethnicities, land and 
environment differ. Above Gentry provides a detailed and somewhat different description on 
the role and task of the JMAC in Haiti. The description is supported by Berdal and Ucko 
claiming that the JMAC was able to develop actionable tactical as well as operational 
intelligence. JMAC intelligence “proved critical to destroying the ‘gang structures’ in Port-au-
Prince” (Berdal & Ucko, 2014, p. 6) much resembling the way Special Forces utilize 
intelligence
40
. Targeted individuals and target packs, though the operations had strategic value 
for the mission, is different from the intended use of a JMAC emphasizing on a predictive, 
forward-looking, comprehensive and operational capability.  
 
According to Shetler Jones, JMAC’s mandate is ambiguous because “UN policy is unclear 
about whether a JMAC’s primary focus is on (1) mission security, (2) operational planning, or 
(3) long-term strategic mission planning” (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 3). Shelter Jones 
provided his insight 7 years prior to the JMAC Policy publication. Rietjens and Waard forget 
to mention, that, though the Policy does not prioritize between the three focus areas listed 
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 The JMAC in Haiti was supported by US intelligence capabilities and the chief JMAC was a former CIA 
operative according to professor Sarah-Myriam Martin Brulè at the JMAC course in Oslo 12-17 November 
2017. Brulè is currently drafting the JMAC Field handbook that will be published in January 2018. 
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above, they are all covered. Having in mind that all UN missions are different, a JMAC 
Policy might benefit by leaving it to the MLT and chief JMAC to tailor how the JMAC 
should support and prioritize in UN peace operations. 
 
During the MINUSTAH operation, UN faced an unprecedented luxury that also proved to be 
a challenge; two competing intelligence capabilities. The ASIFU supported troop 
contributions from “the countries that ski”41 with recent experiences from Afghanistan 
provided a substantial intelligence contribution. According to Theunens, both the ASIFU and 
the JMAC would have benefitted from a better differentiation between information sharing, 
division of labor and tasking. A traditional division of labor between strategic, operational 
and tactical levels proved “counter-productive as these levels are most often closely 
intertwined in contemporaneous (asymmetric) conflict environments, and events or incidents 
can easily change dimension in the course of their development” (Theunens, 2017, p. 17).  
Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch have described malfunctions, which can arise when two 
separate organizational units focus their activities on the same task and environment; 
competitive clashes, redundancy of effort, and poor coordination. Given their overlapping 
task-settings and complementary features, Rietjens and Waard recommended to merge the 
JMAC and ASIFU into a single organizational entity (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 21). 
Furthermore, looking at the way the UN have organized their situational awareness, 
information sharing and intelligence capabilities at the operational and strategic level there is 
a clear resemblance to a matrix organization. The bureaucratic rivalry – the turf wars - 
between UN entities can, maybe, be tracked back to Lawrence and Lorsch`s malfunctions.  
 
In 2016 Abilova and Novosseloff stated that the “UN already has some of the right tools in 
place, whether at headquarters or in field missions, but it lacks the framework and mindset to 
use these tools in a cohesive and coordinated manner”. To achieve this comprehensiveness, 
they claimed, the UN needed a proper intelligence doctrine. They underlined that the doctrine 
should not only be for the military components of missions but for “UN missions as a whole” 
(Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 28). The current UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy 
recognize and describe the need to liaison with non-mission entities for the purposes of 
sharing intelligence and that participating UN mission entities shall make use of standardized 
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 Interview with John Karlsrud. «Countries that ski» equals western and developed countries that differ from 
«the barefoot countries” being the developing countries. 
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tools to enhance interoperability. There are however technological and cultural “bridges to 
cross”. 
 
UN leadership should urge the various entities dealing with information analysis to share their 
products to overcome unfruitful turf wars. Willmot goes as far as to suggest that all UN 
officials should be evaluated to what extent they are capable to cooperate with relating UN 
entities (Willmot, 2017, p. 56). Another option to improve coordination could be to go back to 
the Brahimi Report’s recommendation “to collect all UN structures dealing with analysis on 
the thirty-eighth floor of the UN building” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 28). 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the passive information gathering to ensure 
situational awareness and understanding in a Chapter VI setting, and covert information 
collection that could be confused with espionage, in peace enforcement/making settings 
(Theunens, 2017, p. 7). Should UN Intelligence only address Peacekeeping Operations? 
Theunens supports Abilova and Novosseloff addressing the need for an all-encompassing UN 
Intelligence policy. As recent UN peace operations indicate, peacekeeping operations, though 
still the main UN peace mission operation, is a limited one dimensional approach to UN and 
Intelligence. Intelligence is needed in all branches of UN peace operations. A policy should 
describe UN intelligence ranging from political missions to peace enforcement, from the 
tactical to the strategic level and finally, yet importantly, define information sharing tasks and 
responsibilities for all actors taking part in the multi-dimensional missions. Hopefully, the 
current policy can be seen as one step in this direction. 
 
Whether UN peace operations that have a JMAC should maintain a separate U2 could be 
debated. TCCs providing staff to JMAC, in addition to U2 and national intelligence liaison 
elements, TCCs are likely to give priority to their national assets, to the detriment of the U2, 
making it more difficult for the U2 to provide a meaningful contribution. If the U2 and JMAC 
are integrated as one team, cross-fertilization between experienced civilian JMAC analysts 
and their uniformed counterparts will be greatly enhanced
42
 (Theunens, 2017, p. 13). Instead 
of the JMAC, in addition to U2 and other UN entities monitoring (social) media in an 
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 Theunens claims that a fusion of the military intelligence branch would improve military intelligence as it 
would reduce the learning time for uniformed personnel and mitigating the impact of high rotation rates. 
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uncoordinated manner, “a coordinated approach would allow all to rely on each other’s 
experience and expertise” (Theunens, 2017, p. 13).  
 
Expanding on Theunens concern, the co-location argument addresses the initial and 
conceptual JMAC discussion of centralization versus de-centralization. Should the UN peace 
operation actors provide staffing to the JMAC and hence reduce their influence to a body 
designed to serve the HoM, or should the JMAC rely on the actors to provide and forward 
information to the JMAC? To centralize the JMAC organization would require de-
centralizing of information, thus vastly enhancing vertical and horizontal distribution of 
intelligence. This would make the JMAC more of an intelligence hub at the operational level, 
contrary to its current perceived role as an “advisor entity” of the SRSG. 
 
Nations have concerns towards an UN Intelligence capability, as do UN entities in relation to 
how tasks and responsibilities should be managed. The rivalry, turf wars and internal 
bureaucratic resistance within UN entities does not serve the interest of optimizing UN 
Intelligence.  Within missions, individuals or components may wish to be the ones to have the 
“exclusive” report on a particular event or issue. Actors outside the mission may resist sharing 
information with political and/or security actors, out of concern for jeopardizing their 
operations and the security of their beneficiaries and personnel. “UN entities can easily 
hamper information sharing and hide behind different funding mechanisms, procedures, 
mandates and lack of strategic unity of effort” (Willmot, 2017, p. 26). UN intelligence 
requires leadership and incentives to establish mechanisms to enhance inter-departmental 
cooperation above the JMAC and the operational level. 
 
5.3 Acquisition 
Intelligence methodology and ethics 
Providing information about threats to peace and information gathering has always been at the 
core of UN peace operations. There are several potential Intelligence sources in UN missions. 
Media and NGOs have already been identified and represent a potential source of 
information. Furthermore, TCCs are normally an important actor providing integrated tactical 
as well as independent strategic capabilities. Within the TCCs and their military component 
there is a variety of possibilities – counter battery radars, tactical signals intelligence, 
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convoys, patrols, OPs, key leadership engagement and engagement with population (Maceda, 
2007, p. 12). Intelligence resources are normally scarce and must be optimized to cover MLTs 
priorities. 
 
Hugh Smith, of the Australian Defence Force Academy’s University College Department of 
Politics, in 1994 demonstrated the need for an institutionalized intelligence function at UN 
Headquarters and in the field. According to Smith, “UN intelligence must be collected openly, 
and will probably become public knowledge sooner rather than later” (Maceda, 2007, p. 7). 
Dorn provides an important contribution to understand the complexity of UN information 
gathering activities. He presents information-gathering activities in a matrix ranging from 
prohibited (black) to permitted (white). Visual observation and public information are both 
clearly within what Dorn describes as the white area, whereas wiretapping and bribery are 
both within the black category.  In-between there is a grey area where important legal, 
political, ethical and military aspects must be carefully balanced in order to prevent 
jeopardizing the consent of the parties. The mandate, available intelligence capabilities and 
the operational environment form the basis for the Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan 
(PKISP).  
 
The PKISP describes “acceptable and unacceptable tools, techniques and procedures of 
peacekeeping intelligence acquisition by the mission, applicable legal obligations, and 
considerations that shall be undertaken when acquiring intelligence, based on the assets 
available to the mission and in line with operational guidance” (United Nations DPKO & 
DFS, 2017, p. 5). The PKISP is developed at the strategic level, but to what extent will it be 
publicly available to the factions? Transparency has traditionally been important in UN peace 
operations, but revealing the techniques and procedures of intelligence gathering is 
contradictory to intelligence culture and practice. Protection of intelligence gathering 
capabilities and sources are at the very core of Western Intelligence culture.  
 
On several occasions, the ethics of UN information gathering activities has been in conflict 
with the methodology used at the tactical and operational level. The UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) - focused on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction disarmament in the aftermath of 
the 1991 Gulf War. Though not a peacekeeping mission;  
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It was the most intrusive information gathering operation in UN history. UNSCOM’s 
mandate allowed it to interrogate Iraqi officials, perform intrusive, unannounced site 
inspections, and use its own aircraft to patrol anywhere in the country. The mission 
incorporated personal on-site inspections with high-tech collection including signals 
intelligence, and electronic surveillance (Dorn, 2003, p. 353). 
 
Following the UNSCOM experience Dorn proposed some general rules to prevent overly 
aggressive intelligence gathering; 
 
First, the UN should preferably not use deception in its information gathering. Second, 
the UN should be open to receiving information from defectors, but should not be 
encouraging them. Third, signals intelligence should be used only to the extent 
justified by the mandate. Forth, and finally, while the UN nay retain secrets, it should 
not make secret agreements with governments, especially the inspected state (Dorn, 
2003, p. 370). 
 
The UN generally does not need covert information because it rarely conducts targeted 
operations. Throughout history, UN missions have used informants and intercepted 
communications contrary to the recommendations by Dorn. UNSCOM is one example, UN 
mission in Congo another as Swedish troops used signal intelligence to support the tactical 
level. Interception of radio waves does not obey national borders and could potentially be 
used to listen not only to peace process spoilers but also to the host government and other 
troop-contributing countries or mission personnel. This could open a Pandora’s box and 
increase mistrust among TCCs. (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 18). The political, 
reputational, and legitimacy costs of the UN aggressively collecting intelligence through 
communication interception, covert action, and informant networks would be extremely high 
(Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 25). However, though tactical signal intelligence is not 
needed in traditional peacekeeping mission, it will severely enhance the capability to protect 
UN troops in what the paper refers to as peace enforcement operations. Thus, intelligence 
capabilities, methods and ethics must be discussed in the context of what kind of UN peace 
operation it supports. 
 
Decision-makers primarily need information that gives them a comprehensive understanding 
covering all aspects of the operational environment. “The parties’ perceptions and intentions 
are more important than their capabilities” (Theunens, 2017, p. 3). This understanding will 
not be defined in New York and will normally be subject to a bottom-up reporting and 
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understanding. In most 21
st
 century UN peace operations, this understanding will be more 
effectively provided following the engagement of locals. As several peace operations cover a 
vast territory, having access to a dispersed population is difficult. Considering the vast areas 
involved, this cannot be done by the military component alone. Thus, information gathering 
and intelligence must include all mission entities in which the military is probably the least 
important one. 
 
Furthermore, it can be challenging to identify representatives who genuinely speak on behalf 
of local people. Sometimes there is a tendency to engage with a small network of people, who 
speak English or French and use jargon familiar to the international community, but who may 
not represent their community. Finally, peace operations’ engagement with civil society 
organizations may raise concerns with the host government unless these relationships are 
carried out with transparency (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 
65). 
 
The JMAC is partly capable of addressing challenges relating to intelligence methodology 
and ethics to ensure interoperability and an efficient collection of information. The PKISP, 
defining and limiting the JMAC and collection capabilities, is developed prior to the 
establishment and deployment of a UN mission. If the situation deteriorates, the JMAC would 
rely on the strategic level to enhance intelligence capabilities. However, chief JMAC is 
responsible to comply within the existing PKISP and defines to what extent intelligence 
methodology is used within the JMAC.  
 
Collection capabilities 
The prospects of the United Nations developing an independent intelligence-collection 
capacity are remote. Whenever intelligence activity of any kind is authorized, it tends to be 
within narrowly defined parameters (Chesterman, 2006, p. 4). John R. Bolton thinks that it 
even would be a mistake to allow the UN to develop its own intelligence gathering capability. 
He claims there is enough open source information generated within the UN system, by 
NGOs in the field, and by the UN's own people. However, that information is not currently 
brought together and analyzed for purposes of looking ahead and anticipating problems. Some 
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even claim that the UN would suffice with open-source information and selective requests for 
classified data from member nations (Lilland, 2001, p. 15).  
 
In a peace operation, “every peacekeeper is a potential intelligence collector”. With easy 
access to the conflict area and extensive interaction with the local population, peacekeepers 
are well positioned to gather intelligence about troop movements and cross-border or inter-
group incidents (Maceda, 2007, p. 50). The UN deploys tens of thousands of staff, many of 
whom have valuable cultural and linguistic skills and who become privy to information 
through their daily interactions with local communities and political actors. This information 
is particularly “rich because of the wide geographical scope of the collection, that UN staff 
members are stationed in remote villages accessible only by foot or helicopter, and because it 
is gathered by a variety of staff, from human rights monitors to military observers”. In this 
respect, UN information gathering capabilities represent a potential, whereas human and 
technical problems hamper information management and analysis that could “transform the 
streams of, more or less, raw data into actionable intelligence” (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 3). 
 
The best information often comes from communities themselves. To avail themselves of this 
information, missions must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more 
effective delivery of protection of civilian mandates and better protection for peacekeepers. 
Improved two-way communication strategies with communities are essential to understand 
their needs, to convey the limits of UN capabilities and to provide information to the civilian 
population (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 25). As soon as the 
first body bag arrives in any western capital, however, this perspective becomes theoretical, 
and the troops confine themselves behind gates or armored vehicles. 
 
The preponderance of the civil affairs UN components is their interaction with the locals. It 
enables them to gather information on, monitor, analyze and report about a range of issues. 
Even organizing and training the locals have proved a significant force multiplier (Hough, 
2007, p. 11). “They can contribute to a comprehensive understanding of conflict drivers, 
perceptions of the mission, mandate and the peace process, institutional capacities and gaps as 
well as the political relationship between the center and the periphery”. The information that 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
70 
is gathered and analyzed by civil affairs may contribute to baseline data on the country or feed 
into reports (Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, 2012, p. 140). 
 
A crucial step toward enhancing intelligence capabilities is to shift from a culture of 
undervaluing routine patrols for collecting information and interacting with the local 
population, to one where human intelligence is viewed as critical to protecting civilians and 
UN personnel. “This is particularly needed in volatile environments where missions risk 
“bunkerization” for fear of casualties, instead of more proactively seeking information needed 
for their protection” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 17). 
 
At the tactical level, battalions rarely gather, process, and write up quality assessments, such 
as: patrol debriefs; minutes from meetings with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action 
reports from civil affairs officers; and translated summaries of local radio broadcasts that 
influence the local.  
 
This vast and underappreciated body of information, almost all of which is 
unclassified, admittedly offers few clues about where to find insurgents, but it does 
provide elements of even greater strategic importance – a map for leveraging popular 
support and marginalizing the insurgency itself (Flynn, Pottinger, & Batchelor, 2010, 
p. 7). 
 
Information gathering in a counterinsurgency differs from information gathering in a 
conventional war. In a conventional conflict, ground units depend heavily on intelligence 
from higher commands to help them navigate the fog of war. Satellites and spy planes 
controlled by people far from the battlefield inform ground units about the strength, location, 
and activity of the enemy before the ground unit even arrives. Information flows largely from 
the top down. In a counterinsurgency, Flynn claims, the flow should be reversed. The “soldier 
or development worker on the ground is usually the person best informed about the 
environment and the enemy” (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 12). 
 
Flynn`s approach is based upon the understanding that the population is the center of gravity 
in a peace operation and population-centric information thus should be the focus of 
information gathering. In large, this population-centric information is in the open domain or 
available from other mission components, i.e. anyone in the mission who interacts with the 
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local population. Hence, properly coordinated Key Leader Engagement (KLE), including 
recording, archiving, and analysis (and sharing of the latter) of the information gathered 
through any interaction with members of local communities is important to enhance the 
institutional ability to understand the operational environment.  
 
“The implications for the future are clear: the more complex, fluid and dynamic the peace 
support context, arguably the more Humint oriented the supporting intelligence architecture 
must become” (Rudner, 2003, p. 386). However, UN peace operations must be careful to 
leave interaction with the local population to specially trained Humint units. Interaction with 
the locals in the mission area should be a focus for all components in UN peace operations. 
Furthermore, interaction prevents alienating and distancing the UN force from the very 
population they are mandated to protect. 
 
Besides people, intelligence gathering require technology and modern sensors. Soldiers from 
various nations now routinely deploy to UN missions with their national night vision 
equipment, which varies greatly in capacity between contingents.  
 
Aerial reconnaissance using digital cameras is [.....] increasingly common and proving 
to be an invaluable form of observation. In several missions, forward-looking infrared 
(FLIR) cameras have been deployed on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Other 
technologies remain desperately needed in UN field missions to enable effective early 
warning and proactive peacekeeping (Dorn, 2010, p. 279).  
 
When launching the surveillance drone capability for MONUSCO, Under- Secretary-General 
Hervé Ladsous said that UN peacekeeping finally “entered the 21st century.”  Strategic 
mission assets such as helicopters and surveillance drones can be under the control of the 
military component in high-risk environments. Looking ahead, the redeployment of NATO 
troops from Afghanistan can pave the way for an increase in available high-tech intelligence 
capabilities. The UN can “offer Western member states theaters where troops can continue to 
deploy and maintain their capacities and capabilities, and UN peace operations can become an 
arena for sharing of experiences between traditional and new TCCs” (Karlsrud, 2017a, p. 
284). But, as UN most likely will never have intelligence gathering capabilities, it is critical 
that the UN is able to fuse information from national high tech capabilities into UN 
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information management systems. Experiences from UNMISS
43
, in which one nation 
provided satellite images to the mission, explains the delicate nature as TCC having direct 
access to information about varying factions which other government actively suppress. 
 
In theater, the JMAC is limited to whatever the TCCs decide to bring to the mission 
especially in relation to high-tech sensors. Thus, more importantly is an enhanced JMAC 
cooperation and alignment of efforts with civilian entities to benefit from all UN entities 
scattered around in the mission area. As professor Sarah-Myriam Martin Brulè
44
 stated, the 
JMAC can and must “foster a collaborative environment”. The latter will, among other things, 
require in-theater training, agreed procedures and standardized information management tools 
to ensure information sharing of “sanitize-able” information and situational awareness in line 
with the “information community” that the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy describes.  
 
Open Source Intelligence 
The agents for information gathering and sharing are changing swiftly and a tremendous 
source of information comes from the Internet, social media and new forms of information 
technology. The UN “are currently developing Diplomatic Pulse, a tool to help to monitor 
official, open-source government information online. By the use of new data visualization 
techniques the aim is to make better use of the open-source data” (UN Secretary General, 
2015b, p. 6). Open source data represents an enormous source of information, but unless 
analyzed by tools and trained individuals with local in-depth knowledge and language skills, 
inadequate analysis and wrong conclusion might be the result.  
 
By combining open sources and the information generated by the sources currently available 
to the UN, there is probably enough information to provide whatever intelligence the UN 
needs. Twenty years after Johnston prediction, the amount of information has grown 
exponentially, the conclusion however, is still valid; “The primary requirement is to organize 
this so that it can be properly processed to produce the finished intelligence that the UN and 
its peacekeepers need” (Johnston, 1997, pp. 7-8). In 2014 Flynn stated that “we create as 
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much information in an hour today as we could download in all of 2004” (Theunens, 2017, p. 
11)
45
. 
 
OSINT is by definition unclassified and can be shared with all troop contributing countries 
and non-governmental organizations. “While a modern, high-tech military operation will 
require more than OSINT can deliver, perhaps 80 percent of all information on any given 
problem is available from open sources, and at relatively low cost” (Maceda, 2007, p. 83). 
Estimates of the proportion of US intelligence derived from non-classified, publicly available 
sources ranges from 40 to 95 per cent, although a commonly accepted figure is 80 per cent. 
While the balance between classified and non-classified material is difficult to quantify 
precisely, for many subjects there is little doubt that OSINT is at least as important as 
classified intelligence. As Google’s John Hanke put it; “ten years ago, this technology was the 
exclusive province of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Five years ago, it cost $14,000 for a 
single image. Now there’s free, global high-resolution imagery”(Maceda, 2007, p. 88). 
 
One of the strengths of social media is that it can provide near real time situational awareness 
of unfolding events. The traditional analytical craft of evaluation of the information, as 
demonstrated during the US Presidential Election in 2016, remains extremely important when 
it comes to social media. They can also be a vital source of information for humanitarian 
organizations in case of natural disasters. Social media is used by activists to disseminate their 
views and mobilize supporters. Statistics concerning the use of social media can provide a 
unique insight into the degree of influence activists or others have on public opinion, 
including the traction gained by calls for civil unrest or other mobilization. 
 
With immense open-source information resources at its fingertips, UN headquarters has the 
potential to do good analysis, if only it could muster the political will to institutionalize the 
practice (Maceda, 2007, p. 9). OSINT can either be centralized at the strategic level, as 
suggested by Maceda, or decentralized at region or country level. A clear delineation about 
responsibility between UN entities should, in any case, be developed at all levels to avoid 
duplication of effort. Maceda recommended that OSINT could be used as a door opener for 
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information gathering and analysis at the strategic level. Simultaneously, OSINT represents 
an opportunity for the JMAC at the operational level with marginal cost. However, OSINT is 
optimized when analyzed by trained people, adequate software and with a regional and 
country specific understanding.  
 
 
5.4 Collation and Examination 
Standardization of intelligence tools 
In December 2015, the United Nations and the Government of Singapore
46
 signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on the development of an information 
management tool in support of UN peacekeeping operations. The aim was to enhance 
situational awareness, enable trend analysis and early warning capacities in field missions. 
This is aligned with UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy stating that “ participating mission 
entities shall make use of standardized tools for the collation of data, including common 
databases, taxonomies and planned indexing and menus” (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 
2017, p. 6). A UN tailored information management tool is a giant leap in the right direction 
and the cooperation between UN and a member state is unique, as this will most likely 
involve an extensive information sharing capability. The overall aim of the MOU can, for 
structural, procedural or technical reasons, be challenging to realize.  
 
 
The MOU can enable the UN to provide systems, much aligned with Lute`s recommendation 
from 2014 and the High Level Panel`s recommendation to provide “relevant and substantive 
training to field missions, improved internal information sharing, electronic records 
management and achieve data liquidity” (Lute, Bager, Dorn, Fryer, & Guha, 2014, p. 69). 
However, having UN turf wars in mind, it is important to underline that the information 
management project must be multi-dimensional in nature both when it comes to funding, 
support, development and use. This must be a project for the whole of UN and the signing of 
the MOU by the DPKO Under-Secretary should not allow increased resilience by UN entities 
in fear of “loosing” influence. Thus, all UN entities must be involved as functionality, 
taxonomy and reporting is developed. 
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The cooperation could provide an UN Peace Operation software platform that can facilitate 
exchange of information horizontally and vertically. Ideally, information-sharing standards 
should be developed so that all data is automatically interoperable, regardless of origin, 
language or security classification. Regardless of technology, the human factors will still 
require that trained operators on software and standards are dedicated to populate the 
database. Sometimes nations do provide information coming directly from national developed 
software with different taxonomy and sometimes even in the form of pdf documents. Without 
any conversion tool the information will be useless for language or taxonomy constraints 
unless it is loaded by hand into databases, which will severely slow data sharing (National 
Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 24). 
 
Looking at the experiences from Mali, the ASIFU put considerable effort into improving the 
flow of information from the regular battalions by offering training programs and providing 
them with computers and village assessment formats. Despite this support, the added value of 
the data brought in by these battalions remained limited. Rietjens and Waard provide several 
reasons for this including  
 
Illiteracy among African soldiers, limited English language skills among all personnel, 
both of which made it problematic to understand intelligence tasks or write after action 
reports, and the basic reluctance to gather and disseminate relevant information due to 
an unfamiliarity with the intelligence process.  
 
Had ASIFU followed a “more organic path and put more effort into improving the stream of 
current intelligence coming from the main force’s battalions—for example, by bringing in 
additional trainers and liaison officers—its own performance would most certainly have been 
enhanced” (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 20). Intelligence tools require solutions that 
effectively can enable information sharing from one location, often remote, to higher-level 
headquarters, which often proves technologically challenging or expensive. 
 
Information should, whenever possible, be collected in a standard format, using agreed 
taxonomy, to facilitate the collation process (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 11). 
This sound straight forward on paper, but my experience from working in NATO is that 
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standardization to ensure interoperability among intelligence tools is extremely challenging
47
. 
First, most nations have their own national intelligence tools sometimes with a different 
taxonomy and exchange protocols. Second, taxonomy must be developed with a close 
cooperation between the users and the nations on the one hand and standardization and 
communication/technology agencies on the other. Third, once the taxonomy has been agreed 
upon, which is a time-consuming effort; the entities making use of the taxonomy normally 
have their own systems.  
 
One common software, covering the needs of all UN entities from tactical to strategic level, is 
unlikely in the near future. NATO projects with capability and standardization development, 
involves NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) and the technical support of NATO 
Communication and Information Agency (NCIA). To sum up – standardization and agreed 
taxonomies sound great in theory, but is time-consuming and requires a responsible body at 
the strategic level to coordinate between all entities, support from the nations and UN as well 
as the support from UN standardization and technology entities. 
 
The 2015 MOU will hopefully provide development and standardization of tools that can 
enhance UN entities to make use of available information. The development of these tools 
will be managed by New York, in relation to funding and inter-departmental coordination, but 
must be supported by the vast experience of JMAC analysts to realize its full potential. Thus, 
the strategic level, supported by Member States, has provided an opportunity to improve 
information management in UN peace operations. To fully benefit from the project, the 
JMAC community must support procedures to mitigate challenges relating to lack of NGOs 
reporting and to ensure that tools contain standardized JMAC reporting formats, products and 
procedures. 
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5.5 Analysis 
Strategic Intelligence Capability  
Intelligence capabilities have always rested with states, not international organizations like the 
UN. The great powers demand control of their intelligence assets, and tend to maintain their 
control of information, thus creating an information asymmetry inside international 
organizations. Especially, the permanent five members of the Security Council enjoy this 
information advantage making them less inclined to approve an independent UN intelligence 
capability. But, as Robert Rehbein at Queen’s College in Kingston Ontario correctly points 
out, “not even US intelligence has information about every point on the globe—especially in 
the countries where the UN often operates” (Maceda, 2007, p. 19).  
 
Since the Peace of Westphalia, the nation state has been the responsible entity in international 
cooperation and mediation. Allowing supranational entities to enhance their influence, 
involves moving the power of balance from the nation state to e.g. the UN. Chesterman 
correctly points out that, “An independent UN voice is a necessary condition for the 
legitimacy of a UN operation. In other words, an autonomous analysis capacity frees the 
collective group from accusations of being a tool of the major powers” (Maceda, 2007, p. 21). 
 
Developing a capacity to evaluate provided intelligence should make the United 
Nations more independent: the organization could itself determine whether 
information is useful, rather than relying on national agencies deciding what the UN 
’needs to know’; the capacity would give greater opportunity for the corroboration of 
different sources; and, if it led to more routine intelligence cooperation  (Chesterman, 
2006, p. 10). 
 
The Brahimi report recommended an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, though 
ignored, the proposal attempted to address the problem of a strategic analysis capability. 
Maceda advocates that JMAC developments do little to fix the problems at UN headquarters. 
He claims that a strategic intelligence doctrine and the capability to acquire and analyze 
OSINT could help the UN improve in this area.  To counter the UN from deploying troops in 
the blind, any new mission needs a solid intelligence baseline. “Since the mission needs this 
information in the planning stage, a JMAC is not capable of creating this product—the JMAC 
has not been formed at this phase” (Maceda, 2007, p. 60). 
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NATO could in some aspects serve as a useful comparison to the UN, having a dedicated 
intelligence branch from the field to the strategic level. The strategic level is supported by 
several NATO entities; NATO Communication and Information Agency, Allied Command 
and Transformation and NATO International Military Staff in Brussels to ensure coherence 
between operations, policies, taxonomy and procurement of new capabilities. Though 
complex and challenging, there is no doubt that intelligence responsibility rests within the J-2 
branch at all levels within NATO.  
Looking at UN crisis management capability, several panels have recommended a strategic 
analysis capability with the permanent staff in New York, which of course is a matter outside 
JMAC sphere of influence. The lack of a permanent strategic intelligence capability severely 
limits JMAC capability at the very beginning of an UN mission. A strategic intelligence 
capability could be the basis for a coherent intelligence architecture within the UN, clarify the 
role of the JMAC and ensure an “intelligence voice” in the UNHQ to facilitate policy, 
procedures and procurement.  
 
Intelligence profession 
In NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 – Peace Support Operations - NATO states that 
mission success relies on “personnel and organizations to be adequately led, trained, 
organized and equipped”. This, in essence, professionalism, will “give it credibility with the 
parties and thereby the ability to achieve its operational objectives” (NATO, 2001, pp. 2-2). In 
UN peace operations in general, and the JMAC specifically, civilian and particularly national 
staff, are often present for longer periods of time than their military counterparts. Military 
staff mostly rotate every six to twelve months, preventing them from establishing 
relationships with the population and building trust (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 16). As 
UN intelligence structures are being planned these crucial facts must be taken into account. 
 
Some JMAC leaders and Chief of Staff in UNMISS in 2013, Colonel Petter Lindquist, argue 
that they have access to almost all the information they need but lack the capacity to analyze it 
and transform it into plans. Improving the analytical capacity of missions has proven to be 
more difficult than improving their technological capacity (Theunens, 2017, p. 5). This is 
reinforced by Willmot claiming that “the amount of information that is useful is limited by 
their absorption capacity” (Willmot, 2017, p. 54). UN JMAC documents hardly mention the 
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importance of, and how to, improve analysis on the individual level and how training should 
be handled. UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, however, describes the need for 
standardized pre-deployment training and education for all personnel involved in all aspects 
of peacekeeping intelligence. How this should be done, and to avoid that UN personnel is 
withdrawn from the mission area to attend, as a student, course specific training must be 
addressed
48
. 
 
The continuity in the civilian personnel’s service is a prerequisite for the creation of an 
institutional memory, backed up by databases. There is, however, a dependence on a limited 
number of individuals for analysis and understanding, to the point that “information is rarely 
institutional and shared less between stakeholders”. When key individuals leave or are 
declared persona non grata, much of the knowledge and contacts are lost (International 
Organization for Migration South Sudan, 2016, p. 45). Civilians often have an extensive 
experience from the region and country. They have established relationships with key 
individuals, and their knowledge, often based upon “gut-feeling” is challenging to store in a 
database. This, however, should not refrain JMAC staff from systematizing and 
institutionalizing their knowledge. Deputy JMAC UNMISS highlights this as one of the main 
challenges in UNMISS today; Extensive personnel experience and contacts must add value 
and not replace the systematic approach to the Intelligence profession.  
 
Uniformed personnel, who usually have limited tours of duty, could make effective use of this 
information in the initial phase of their deployment and enhance their situational awareness. 
This could provide additional value to their contribution besides bringing specific military or 
police expertise to the JMAC and facilitate liaison and information sharing with the 
uniformed mission components (Theunens, 2017, p. 5). A combination of civilian and 
uniformed personnel is essential for the JMAC and modern UN peace operations as  
intelligence structures with civilian, military and police information and analysts, “lead to 
more relevant products for protection activities” (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011, p. 4). The added 
JMAC value presupposes internal and external information sharing.  
 
Willmot, working as an UN information analyst, provides an important aspect concerning 
professionalism, situational awareness and intelligence contribution in the UN. While there is 
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a wealth of talented and capable staff within the UN, she states, “The cadre of professional 
analysts is very small. It is primarily limited to JMAC analysts, security analysts, and 
information analysts working for some of the agencies. There is no sense of professional 
community binding them, and certainly no career path” (Willmot, 2017, p. 6). Analysts must 
be encouraged beyond their monthly salary to leave their chairs and visit the people who 
operate at the grassroots level – civil affairs officers, atmospherics teams, liaison officers, 
female engagement teams, willing NGOs and development organizations, United Nations 
officials and staff officers with infantry battalions (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 17). In some areas 
this would involve a significant personal risk. The larger question for the UN, according to 
Ramjouè, is how it can create incentive structures for staff to contribute to the collective 
rather than personal interests which is a problem in any organization where most personnel 
have very limited job stability
49
 and where there is no clear career path (Ramjoué, 2011, pp. 
13-14).  
 
 
Based upon experiences from Afghanistan, Flynn advocates that brigade and regional 
command intelligence summaries should expand beyond regurgitating the previous day’s 
enemy activity. Periodic topical narratives, on the other hand,  elaborating on “economy, 
atmospherics, development, corruption, governance, and enemy activity in a given district 
will provide an understanding that is invaluable up the chain of command as well as down to 
subordinate units” (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 13). To ensure comprehensive analysis, JMACs 
should be properly staffed, with organic representation from all components—civilian, 
military, and police. All staff officers deployed to military intelligence functions should be 
trained intelligence analysts, and all civilian and police staff deployed to JMACs should have 
experience in information analysis, as well as political-military experience or country/regional 
expertise (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 28). 
 
Organization charts of JMAC staffing from the very beginning of the JMAC-concept 
resemble a more integrated and centralized concept where all mission components and 
relevant entities should provide personnel to the JMAC. Such an organization would most 
likely have made the JMAC an efficient and comprehensive information hub. However, the 
current de-centralized structure has prevented the development of a robust intelligence 
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footprint at the operational level. To access information and enhance coordination between 
entities other mechanisms were developed.  
 
The lack of a professional cadre of intelligence operators is naturally beyond the scope of the 
JMAC to rectify. The JMAC is depending on UNHQ to facilitate staffing as they are the 
entity responsible for the dialog with nations. A professional cadre will either require (1) a 
clearly stated intelligence profession responsibility with incentives for inter-departmental 
intelligence cooperation within the UN or (2) a reorganization of intelligence related entities 
under one Intelligence branch. JMAC influence is normally limited to ensure JMAC specific 
induction training following the arrival of new members. However, to ensure that mission 
related procedures and reporting is optimized, the JMAC is responsible for training 
subordinate structures and intelligence and information individuals.  
 
5.6 Dissemination 
Intelligence Culture 
The authority to disseminate intelligence products, the release authority, shall be clearly 
identified as part of the mission’s Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan and internal 
guidance for participating mission entities. The dissemination of peacekeeping intelligence 
products shall be done “in compliance with the concepts as well as the [...] organizational 
requirements for information classification, security, handling, ownership and sharing” 
(United Nations, 2015, p. 6). 
 
The Secretary-General’s guidance on handling and dissemination of sensitive information 
specifies that information should be primarily made available on a need to know basis. 
Dissemination to heads of components, UNHQ, and as appropriate with the UNCT, should 
however be encouraged to ensure a two-way information flow. 
Experiences show that information from the JMAC is severely restrained to HoM or tailored 
to the actual component requesting the information. This differs from the JMAC guidelines 
that encourage an “information community” to enhance information sharing which has been 
done recently in UNIFIL. The documents cited above are contradictory as to how information 
sharing of intelligence in UN peace operations should be handled, which leave it to the 
discretion of chief JMAC and HoM to decide how to disseminate information. 
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At the strategic level, DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Department of 
Safety and Security all have designated units for information and analysis located on the same 
floor in the Secretariat building, but communication among them is insufficient.” There is no 
system for sharing information and analysis among all stakeholders, and current arrangements 
are too dependent on personalities. Moreover, structural mechanisms to synchronize, 
coordinate, and de-conflict different analyses are generally lacking “(Abilova & Novosseloff, 
2016, p. 19). The good news, according to Steele, is that “most of the huge stores of 
information collected and stored by the various UN agencies—is not secret. The bad news is 
that most of this information is not digital and usually not in English”. The problem of 
information sharing, therefore, is one of culture and conversion. “A culture that fosters 
information-sharing must be created”, along with a capability that permits ‘‘just enough, just 
in time’’ conversion of analog information into digital information (Steele, 2006, p. 11). 
 
Uniformed personnel at the operational level, may be discouraged to share information with 
the JMAC because they doubt the mission’s capability to protect classified information given 
the absence of secure communication means and the UN’s lack of “intelligence-culture” 
(Theunens, 2017, p. 8). A report by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) furthermore 
reveals problems which are both structural and political in nature, and which stand in the way 
of effective use of consolidated analysis at both the headquarters and in the field (Ekpe, 2007, 
p. 18). A closer look at OCHA’s operations reveals problems that stand in the way of fully 
exploiting information assets to effectively coordinate humanitarian emergencies. Among 
these are a “deliberate reluctance and mistrust among agencies to share critical information 
rapidly, and a lack of understanding in what should be reported by the field disaster 
management teams to the resident coordinator” (Ekpe, 2007, p. 18). 
 
In reforming its analytical capacities and capabilities, the UN should focus on improving its 
current structures and on strengthening information analysis and sharing more than 
information collection. The UN should “prioritize developing a comprehensive information-
management system rather than new intelligence infrastructure, which most member states are 
likely to oppose for reasons of funding and politics” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 8).  
What it comes down to, is a responsible body, from the field to New York that can analyze 
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information and provide a predicative assessment of “so what” to decision makers. In the 
military culture, this is called intelligence architecture. 
 
Nordli and Lindboe provide a great example of how people transform culture and how closely 
linked it is to procedures and policy. During the first year, the policy of the ASIFU was to 
disseminate products to the largest possible audience. Dissemination was based on the need to 
share principle. When necessary, products were subject to sanitization
50
. JMAC products, 
which should be focused at the operational level, could be shared without jeopardising source 
confidentiality or security with the right resolution. Thus, dissemination of products should be 
both possible and desirable in order to ensure that the entire mission and external entities 
receive timely information to support their decision-making processes (Nordli & Lindboe, 
2017, p. 20).  
 
A shift in the dissemination policy evolved as products were being disseminated on an 
increasingly stricter need to know basis (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 18). Though, there might 
be sound reason for this change, it supports the arguments of Nordli and Lindboe, that, in 
theory, nothing is preventing operational level intelligence entities to enhance information 
sharing. Willmot, however, correctly warns that information flow must not be unidirectional. 
“It is critical that the system does not only pull information into the center, but also pushes it 
back out to the contributors (Willmot, 2017, p. 59). In 2004 Steele predicted that the modern 
leaders of intelligence cultures must be public rather than secret and share rather than steal 
(Steele, 2004, p. 7). Someone would claim that leadership creates culture, in this case; UN 
intelligence culture needs a responsible and accountable authority.  
 
The presence of national staff within UN missions, as well as general lack of confidentiality, 
can be serious impediments to parallel forces sharing information with UN missions. 
Intelligence and information sharing is about trust. The UN’s assets, particularly following its 
geographical reach and the diversity of its staff, are “often underused or misused in missions 
and in headquarters” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 27). Ramjouè findings support this, 
stating that “information sharing is mostly based on personal connections rather than 
institutional standard operating procedures” (Ramjoué, 2011, pp. 13-14). This trust can be 
                                                 
50
 The process of removing sensitive information from a document or other message, so that the product could be 
distributed to a broader audience. 
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reinforced with separate secure systems to handle sensitive information across different 
mission components supported by guidelines for sharing information and protecting sources. 
Particularly, it must decide “who will have access to what information—that is, how to 
balance the need to know with open, transparent processes and a culture that incentivizes the 
need to share” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 29). 
 
The military must move beyond rhetoric that favors greater information sharing, and 
should ensure that it gets the incentive structures right. Senior officers must take the 
lead on such issues rather than delegating them to information technology, civil affairs 
or public affairs personnel. Soldiers must be provided with new and clear regulations 
on what does and does not need to be classified. Those who over-classify information 
must be reprimanded, and those who share information that leads to positive outcomes 
should be rewarded and publicly praised for doing so (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, 
p. 3). 
 
To ensure efficient dissemination of intelligence in UN missions, the JMAC and MLT must 
be the key players in developing this culture. Though policies and training are important, and 
acknowledging that personalities play an important role, culture is a matter of trust and 
leadership. Trust is efficiently developed when humans interact, share a common goal and 
respect differences in mandate and tasks. Thus, the JMAC has a vital task in building trust 
among all relevant information actors in the mission and find mechanisms that will exploit 
commonalities and suppress divisive factors. However, as long as the JMAC does not have 
tasking authority, only a coordinating role, both leadership and culture might be hard to find. 
The in-theatre face-to-face interaction nonetheless provides the JMAC with possibilities to 
exploit the desire for improved information sharing. 
 
Information sharing procedures 
In all missions improved information sharing procedures are necessary to ensure that the 
JMAC is able to fulfil its intelligence mandate (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 2). Though the military 
component has challenges in relation to the JMAC, Ramjouè`s findings indicate that most 
JMACs “obtained better cooperation from military teams than they did from their political, 
civil and/or electoral affairs colleagues” (Ramjoué, 2011, pp. 13-14). JMACs are required to 
produce integrated analysis and assessment, but there is “no requirement to include 
information and analysis from country teams or to share the analytical products with them”. 
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Where the mission and UNCT are integrated, the Resident Coordinator will receive JOC and 
JMAC products; otherwise, practice varies across missions (Willmot, 2017, p. 51). 
 
For intelligence to be effective at the UN, it requires processes and structures that ensure it 
can be shared and stored securely. These structures need to be governed by strict rules and 
procedures, tasking, and guidance (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 3) 
In principle, there are two main approaches to information sharing. First, we have the 
traditional “push concept” in which information is forwarded by using dedicated email 
addresses. The “push concept” has advantages, but is increasingly being replaced by a web- 
and standards-based, open information-sharing environment, also referred to as the “pull 
concept”. Such an open information community allows anyone with access to get any 
information available that has been uploaded to the network.    
 
Lack of shared database and hybrid platforms built specifically for sharing information has 
prevented total coordination and cooperation among civilians and military segments. A 
number of technical challenges hinder effective information sharing. Most organizations have 
their own information systems with limited access for other actors. The sites normally require 
passwords, and several systems only allow people to join if they are specifically invited or 
sponsored by another user or administrator. Sites also tend to be poorly designed and ill-
suited for individuals with relatively poor web connections. (Humanitarian Practice Network, 
2013, p. 20). 
 
Willmot claims that a comprehensive UN information sharing protocol, setting out what kind 
of information are to be shared with whom, for what purpose, and how the information is to 
be handled and used “would bring clarity, predictability, and accountability to the process” 
(Willmot, 2017, p. 71). Military institutions that request information from civilian agencies 
must be prepared, when requesting the information, to explain how it will be managed and for 
what purpose it will be used. “Civilian organizations will be far less cautious about sharing 
information with the armed forces if they can be sure that it will be used for beneficial 
purposes, such as reconstruction or humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in 
highly insecure areas”. Furthermore, they must ensure that it does not feed into intelligence or 
targeting processes, and the armed forces should be “ready and willing to explain what 
ultimately came of information provided by civilian organizations” (Humanitarian Practice 
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Network, 2013, p. 22). Improved understanding and training in information sharing and 
reporting based on a common understanding that not all details must be included, would 
benefit reporting between civilian and military actors. Several information requirements in a 
multi-dimensional conflict can be fully addressed by civilian UN and NGO entities without 
compromising their sources or endanger their field workers, and in most cases NGOs might 
actually benefit from a better UN situational awareness.  
 
The JMAC can ensure that there are information sharing procedures in place to enhance 
situational awareness among the MLT as well as the different entities in the mission. 
Currently this is outside the mandate and task of the JMAC. By adapting policies and 
procedures to enhance JMAC`s role in facilitating information sharing in UN missions, the 
JMAC can be pivotal in improving UN intelligence and peace operations. 
 
Security and classification 
The Final Report of the 2015 Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN 
Peacekeeping emphasizes the importance of secure communications and of analytic support 
tools for JMACs. The UN has no secure communications and all computers are connected to 
the Internet both at the strategic and operational levels. The lack of an appropriate and secure 
UN system for sharing information undermines the protection of missions, especially in 
asymmetric threat environments, and makes partners reluctant to share some of their 
information. No secure means of communication, even in a Chapter VI-setting like UNIFIL 
seriously hampers information sharing (Theunens, 2017, p. 8). 
 
Improvements are needed in the UN’s classification and information security systems both at 
headquarters and in the field and a natural starting point is within the intelligence bodies 
(Theunens, 2017, p. 10). This includes the labeling of sensitive information as confidential, 
strictly confidential and unclassified by the originator of the information. JMAC Guidelines 
underline that Chief JMAC shall develop “security procedures that cater to the peculiar 
information security classification and security requirements in close cooperation with 
UNDSS, the Peacekeeping Information Management Unit, and DPKO–DFS Communication 
and Information Technology Section “ (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 10). This 
requires that security procedures, intelligence architecture and flexibility is included as 
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software are developed. The development of tools for JMACs should be coordinated with UN 
partners to facilitate “interoperability” and ensure the efficient use of resources.  
 
There are situations where humanitarian or UN actors possess information that is classified 
and that cannot be shared with others without compromising the identity of the source or 
exposing individual(s) to potential risk. In such cases, information will not be shared between 
UN missions and the humanitarian community. Humanitarian actors will not share 
information if they believe that this could imperil the safety of civilians. For this reason, they 
will generally seek to” protect the identity or locations of civilians if such information might 
be used by armed groups for targeting” (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 7). 
 
There is a lack of awareness of the parameters used for classification of information, and 
following the field research of Abilova and Novosseloff many interviewees reported that the 
“usage is haphazard”. While some classified documents and information are shared, sharing is 
largely dependent on personal relationships and meetings (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 
25). Thus, the preferred standard for sharing information is personal trust, not UN 
classification standards. Informal intelligence reports thus circumvent the established checks 
and balances within the intelligence system and raise issues of control, accountability and 
authenticity. Unless developing a “qualitative control, qualitative technical improvements in 
collection and dissemination can actually undermine the efficacy of the overall system” 
(Dupont, 2003, p. 31). 
 
Haphazard classification of intelligence in the UN raises concerns. The Secretary General`s 
bulletin consisting of four pages from 2007 is the authoritative publication being referred to in 
relation to security, classification and handling of information. However, it does not address 
procedures concerning exchange of information between the uniformed components, civilian 
components and non UN humanitarian assistance entities. In NATO documents these 
procedures are described in detailed in numerous documents because of their sensitive nature. 
  
To improve information sharing, the UN and JMAC are in desperate need for enhanced policy 
and procedural regulations on how to ensure then security and safety of information and 
sources. JMAC security and classification procedures must derive from policies and 
procedures being developed at the strategic level with the approval of the member nations. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
88 
Most regulations and policies could be directly incorporated into new software being 
developed. JMAC can only support the regulations by upholding the principles and 
procedures that define UN security and classification regime. If the strategic regulations do 
not fully enable JMAC to operate according its mandate, these concerns must be addressed by 
the JMAC.  
 
Cooperation with non UN entities 
Civil humanitarian organizations try to maintain their workers’ safety by not taking sides in 
conflict and working to relieve all social suffering. NGOs can provide insights into local 
dynamics that affects the protection of human security, but they do not want to be involved in 
implementing a counter-insurgency strategy. Local groups need to trust an organization to tell 
them the mechanisms through which recruitment to insurgency groups is occurring. The 
“protection of those sources and of that information is something that builds trust over time” 
(National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 17). Thus, NGOs often do not even want to 
indicate their exact locations on publicly available information sources.  
 
Afghanistan has come to be seen as a laboratory for the development of civil–military 
coordination and information sharing. However, while numerous information-sharing portals 
have been established, none has emerged as the single hub for coordination between civilian 
organizations and military actors. Still, after years of cooperation military personnel often do 
not understand and sometimes do not even like NGOs, as illustrated by these quotes “NGOs 
clog up my battle space.” “They are in the way.” “NGOs don’t want to be seen with us in 
uniform.” “Stereotypes exist in both directions, and both sets of stereotypes are damaging” 
(National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 11). 
  
In general, the goal of humanitarian organizations is to protect human security, whereas the 
goal of government agencies and the military is to advance national security interests.  
Data sharing is more likely in situations and contexts “where the missions of civil society 
organizations overlap with those of the military and government”. When missions are in 
conflict, data sharing is more difficult (National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 18). The 
evolution of UN operations in the 21
st
 century towards more protection of civilians, in theory, 
should narrow the gap between military and the humanitarian organizations objectives. Thus, 
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exchange of information between civilian and military might increase if protection of civilian 
continue to be a defining aim of UN peace operations.   
 
The use of information could have positive or negative consequences. Will the military use 
information provided by civilian organizations for targeting purposes? The fears “particularly 
relates to the human rights and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) entities, 
which often have some of the best access to information from the communities they work 
with but are reluctant to share it with the mission’s military component” (National Academy 
of Engineering, 2012, p. 20). These actors fear that their independence, neutrality, or 
impartiality is further eroded if they are seen as cooperating too closely with the military 
component. Especially as the sustainability for the military is often short term, whereas NGOs 
tend to look at issues for decades in a more open and extended context. Sanitization of 
information can prove challenging as some humanitarian actors operate in geographical areas, 
sometimes all alone, and any reporting from an area can easily be traced back to the 
originator.  
 
Civil–military information sharing systems should, according to Humanitarian Practice 
Network, be established through a collaborative process. Upon reading UN Peacekeeping 
Intelligence Policy, which hardly covers any humanitarian aspects (including UN entities), 
those developing the Policy (DPKO) have disregarded maybe the two single most important 
experiences to facilitate information sharing – collaboration and trust.   
 
Cooperation between UN intelligence mission entity, currently embodied with the JMAC, and 
civilian humanitarian entities do present several opportunities. Though there are differences in 
perception and tasks, there is a common humanitarian ground that can be exploited. Trust is 
critical and must be based upon personal relationship and reassurance about the ability to 
handle information and protect sources. The crucial and feasible role of the JMAC, despite all 
the hurdles, would be to ensure that a collaborative environment is developed in the mission 
area.  
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5.7 A summary - limitations or possibilities  
The Intelligence Cycle has framed a discussion leading to an enhanced understanding of 
Intelligence in the UN and to what extent the JMAC is able to address intelligence challenges 
in UN peace operations. A summary of the findings are listed below in table 4; 
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51
 
                                                 
51 Table 4: Summary of findings - limitations and possibilities 
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The main contribution of the paper is the systematic approach to understanding UN 
intelligence key challenges in relation to the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle.  
 
The findings indicate that the JMAC is less likely to succeed in all matters relating to 
responsibility, authority and vital national concerns. Unless there is a strategic intelligence 
entity that can support the JMAC and be a constructive counterpart to UN member states, UN 
key challenges related to Tasking will remain unresolved.  
 
When it comes to Acquisition, the vast UN footprint in multi-dimensional operations 
combined with open source information represent an opportunity that can and should be 
exploited by the JMAC. It would, however, be enhanced if inter-departmental coordination at 
the strategic level is improved. 
 
The JMAC community has been given an excellent opportunity to benefit from the MOU that 
will provide the UN with an improved information management capability. The MOU can 
vastly increase the UN capability of examination, evaluation and collation. The UN 
intelligence and JMAC community must ensure that the IT-architecture is flexible and enable 
all UN entities to share information with “information communities” on a need to share basis. 
 
All matters relating to Analysis in chapter 5 is beyond the influence of the JMAC. UNHQ 
must facilitate and systematize intelligence training, recruitment and tools. 
 
As for Dissemination, the JMAC supported by the MLT can foster a mission environment of 
collaboration and trust, “intelligence culture”, by defining common in-theatre procedures that 
can enhance information sharing between UN entities and NGOs.  
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6 Conclusion 
The paper has been aiming to identify UN key challenges in relation to Intelligence and 
consider their impact on UN Peace operations. Furthermore, the paper has discussed if and 
how the JMAC can succeed in mitigating these challenges.  
 
Following the introduction and the research design chapters, aiming to create the framework 
for the paper, chapter 3 explain how UN peace operations have evolved by specifically 
understanding terminology, mandate and the key characteristics. Departing from UN peace 
operations, chapter 3 further introduced intelligence. The chapter presented a post-Cold war 
look at UN and intelligence, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy and enhanced the 
understanding of Intelligence according to different layers and types. Furthermore, it 
introduced the main actors at the strategic and operational level and finally the JMAC 
concept, the latter as described in UN official documents.  
Chapter 4, using UNMISS and MINUSMA as current examples, served as a basis to identify 
key UN Intelligence challenges and their impact.  
Following the five steps of the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle, chapter 5 discussed UN 
key challenges and how the JMAC potentially could mitigate the obstacles. Chapter 5 finished 
with a summary of the findings and conclusions for each step of the Intelligence Cycle.  
 
The findings indicate that, though the JMAC concept has enhanced UN capabilities in peace 
operations, there are some grave challenges that cannot be addressed by the JMAC alone;  
 Peace Operations and Intelligence in the UN are contested with a lack of coherent 
terminology complicating the understanding and discussion. The paper provides a 
comprehensive understanding of 21
st
 century UN peace operation terminology to better 
guide future discussion of UN peace operations and the role of Intelligence in the UN.  
 Intelligence in the UN and all the steps in the Intelligence Cycle, can be more effectively 
addressed if there is a responsible and accountable strategic entity that ensures 
information sharing at all levels from the field to New York. The discussion concludes 
that the JMAC cannot mitigate the majority of key UN Intelligence challenges, realize its 
potential and succeed without an overarching intelligence body. 
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The UN provides several possibilities for unclassified future research about Intelligence. 
Further research about UN and Intelligence could look into; (1) how the strategic level should 
develop structures, procedures and technology to provide the strategic backbone needed to 
support the JMAC concept, (2) explore the variety in UN peace operation terminology to 
contribute to a more systematic and coherent discussion about Intelligence and UN peace 
operations and (3) can cost efficient preventive efforts replace expensive peacekeeping 
operations? The difficulty of producing military intelligence in UN missions does not 
necessarily come from the number of units involved, but “the level of attention given to 
intelligence” (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
95 
7 References 
7.1 Annex A List of acronyms  
ASIFU All Source Information Fusion Unit 
AU  African Union 
CMAG Civil-Military Advisory Group  
DFS  Department of Field Support 
DPA  Department of Political affairs 
DPI  Department of Public Information 
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General 
DSS  Department of Safety and Security 
GA  General Assembly 
HCT  Humanitarian Country Team 
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations 
HoM  Head of Mission 
IOT  Integrated Operational Team 
ISP  Intelligence Support Plan 
IR  Information or Intelligence Requirements 
JCB  Joint Coordination Board 
JMAC  Joint Mission Analysis Center 
MINUJUSTH United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti 
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
MLT  Mission Leadership Team 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NODEFIC Norwegian Defense International Center 
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OHCHR Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OMA  Office of Military Affairs 
PAD  Political Affairs Division 
PD-MMSS Police Division’s Mission Management and Support Section 
PKI  Peacekeeping Intelligence 
PKISP  Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan 
PKO   Peacekeeping Operations 
PO  Peace Operations 
SC  Security Council 
SG  Secretary General 
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General 
TCC  Troops Contributing Countries 
UN   United Nations 
UNDP  UN Development Program 
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters 
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan 
UNOCC UN Operations and Crisis Centre 
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7.2 Annex B Exploratory interviews 
     
Date Name Where Work experience 
21 
September
  
Karin 
Christoffersen  
Norwegian People`s 
Aid - Oslo 
Senior Advisor Norwegian 
People`s Aid  
Advisor to OCHA in UNMISS 
from Feb. 2014 to Feb. 2016 
11 
October 
Ann-Kristin 
Kvilekval 
E-mail Police liaison to FOH and 
several UN missions 
18 
October 
Petter Lindquist Norwegian Defense 
Staff and Command 
College - Oslo 
Colonel and Chief of Staff in 
UNMISS in 2013 
23 
October 
Stian Kjeksrud Norwegian Defense 
Staff and Command 
College - Oslo 
Scientist at FFI – specializing 
in UN and Intelligence 
24 
October 
John Karlsrud Norwegian Defense 
Staff and Command 
College - Oslo 
Special Advisor to SRSG Chad 
in 2007 and Senior researcher 
at NUPI 
11 
November 
Petter Vindheim Facetime LtCol and currently Deputy 
JMAC in UNMISS 
13 
November 
Nadia Assouli Norwegian Defense 
Staff and Command 
College - Oslo 
Analysts in UNOCC and 
responsible for drafting UN 
Peacekeeping Intelligence 
Policy 
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